Nevada Adjuster Insurance Exam 2026

Four Separate Licenses, and You May Hold Only One

Nevada does not have *an* adjuster license with sub-types. It has four separate licenses, and the governing text says so twice over. NRS 684A.050(1): *"The Commissioner may license an individual as an independent adjuster, a public adjuster, a company adjuster or a staff adjuster. No individual shall be licensed concurrently under the same license or separate licenses as more than one such type of adjuster."*

Read the phrase "under the same license or separate licenses." The statute expressly contemplates that these are separate instruments and bars concurrency both ways. NRS 684A.120(1)(b) confirms it from the other direction: the license document itself must state *"The classification of the license, whether as an independent adjuster, a public adjuster, a company adjuster or a staff adjuster."*

The chapter has a name and a boundary. NRS 684A.010: *"This chapter applies to adjusters only as defined in NRS 684A.020, and does not apply to any person who adjusts or settles claims relating to life or health coverage or annuities. This chapter may be cited as the Nevada Insurance Adjusters Law."* So Nevada has no life or health adjuster licensing at all — the credential is functionally a property and casualty credential even though nothing in its name says so.

Two of the four are not what their names suggest, and the next two sections take them apart. The short version: the person most states call a *staff adjuster* is, in Nevada, a company adjuster — and that license is voluntary. What Nevada calls a staff adjuster is a workers' compensation role at a third-party administrator.

There are also two temporary routes that are not among the four: the temporary emergency (catastrophe) license under NRS 684A.060(3)–(7), and a temporary independent adjuster license under NRS 684A.150 for continuing the business of a licensee who has died or become disabled. Business entities may be licensed under NRS 684A.080.

One credential you may still see listed does not exist. The associate adjuster was abolished effective 1 January 2020. The word appears nowhere in the current chapter.

'Staff Adjuster' Does Not Mean What It Means Anywhere Else

This is the single most portable error a candidate can make in Nevada, because the words are familiar and the meanings are swapped.

NRS 684A.030(3): *"'Company adjuster' means a salaried employee of an insurer who: (a) Investigates, negotiates or settles property, casualty or surety claims, including, without limitation, workers' compensation claims; and (b) Obtains a license pursuant to this chapter."*

NRS 684A.030(4): *"'Staff adjuster' means a person who investigates, negotiates or settles workers' compensation claims under the authority of a third-party administrator who holds a certificate of registration issued by the Commissioner pursuant to NRS 683A.08524."*

In every other state in this library, "staff adjuster" means the carrier's own employee. In Nevada that person is a company adjuster. Nevada's staff adjuster works for a TPA, and only on workers' compensation.

The two remaining definitions are conventional. NRS 684A.030(1) — an independent adjuster represents the insurer or self-insurer, contracts as an independent contractor, is treated for tax purposes consistently with that status, and handles property, casualty or surety claims including workers' compensation. NRS 684A.030(2) — a public adjuster is *"employed by and representing solely the financial interests of the insured named in the policy,"* and *"does not include an adjuster who investigates, negotiates or settles workers' compensation claims."*

The examination matrix confirms both boundaries structurally. A staff adjuster sits for Exam 16 (Workers Compensation) only. A public adjuster sits for Exam 15 (Property and Casualty) only — never workers' compensation. The credential structure and the exam structure agree.

The Company Adjuster License Is Voluntary — Three Textual Proofs

Nevada is the only state in this library with an adjuster license that is optional by design, and the drafting is deliberate enough that it takes three passes to see.

Proof 1 — the definition is circular on purpose. NRS 684A.030(3)(b) makes *"Obtains a license pursuant to this chapter"* an element of the definition of company adjuster. You do not become a company adjuster and then get licensed; you become one by getting licensed. So nobody is ever an unlicensed company adjuster, and the licensure mandate can never bite.

Proof 2 — the statute says it outright. NRS 684A.040(4): *"A salaried employee of an insurer who investigates, negotiates or settles workers' compensation claims may, but is not required to, obtain a license as a company adjuster pursuant to this chapter. The provisions of subsections 1, 2 and 3 do not apply to a salaried employee of an insurer."*

That last sentence is sweeping, and it is broader than the first. Subsection 1 is the licensure mandate, subsection 2 is the gross misdemeanor, and subsection 3 is the administrative fine of not more than $1,000 per violation. All three switch off entirely for any salaried employee of an insurer — not merely the ones handling workers' compensation.

Proof 3 — the definition of "adjuster" excludes them. NRS 684A.020(2)(c) excludes a salaried employee of an insurer unless the employee both (1) handles workers' compensation and (2) obtains a license. The prongs are conjunctive. An insurer's salaried comp adjuster who never applies fails prong (2), and so is not an "adjuster" within the chapter at all.

Now the contrast, which is the teaching point. NRS 684A.020(2)(q) excludes a person adjusting under a registered third-party administrator's authority *"unless the person investigates, negotiates or settles workers' compensation claims."* That "unless" pulls TPA comp adjusters back IN — and NRS 684A.030(4) then names them staff adjusters. Their license is mandatory.

The Salaried Employee, the Nonresident Catastrophe Adjuster, and the Body Shop Bar

NRS 684A.040(1) states the rule: *"Except as otherwise provided in NRS 684A.060, no person may act as, or hold himself or herself out to be, an adjuster in this State unless then licensed."* Violation is a gross misdemeanor (subsection 2) and carries an administrative fine of not more than $1,000 for each violation (subsection 3).

But subsection 4 switches all three off for any salaried employee of an insurer — see the previous section. That is the largest exemption in the chapter and it is not in the section captioned *"Exceptions."*

NRS 684A.060(2) adds another: *"No license shall be required of a nonresident salaried adjuster for the adjustment in this state of one or more losses arising out of a catastrophe common to all such losses where such losses are designated to be a catastrophe by responsible insurance associations or the Commissioner."*

Read the designator. The catastrophe may be declared by *"responsible insurance associations"* — a private body — or the Commissioner. No governmental declaration is required at all, and one of the two permitted designators is not a government actor. That is unusual even among states that do not require a declared disaster.

And there is a bar nobody expects. NRS 684A.055: *"No person who is engaged in the business of repairing the bodies of automobiles may: 1. Be licensed pursuant to this chapter. 2. Own a controlling interest in a business entity licensed pursuant to NRS 684A.080."* A flat anti-conflict rule, added in 1985, sitting in the licensing chapter rather than in the unfair practices act.

Note what NRS 684A.055 does not say. It is not a disclosure rule and not a consent rule. A body-shop owner cannot cure it by disclosing the interest — the license is simply unavailable, and so is a controlling interest in a licensed entity.

Twenty Hours the Department Does Not Publish

Nevada requires 20 hours of adjuster prelicensing education. The requirement is adjuster-specific and real — and it is regulation-only.

NAC 684A.220: a course must consist of *"at least 5 hours of instruction … in the provisions of title 57 of NRS and the regulations adopted pursuant thereto, at least one-half of which must cover the laws and regulations common to all lines of insurance"* plus *"at least 15 hours of instruction in the classroom covering: (1) Principles and concepts of insurance in general; (2) Basic principles and concepts of the line of insurance for which the applicant is applying; (3) The processes related to adjusting a claim; (4) The ethical responsibilities of the adjuster; and (5) Regulation by the government."*

So the composition is 5 + 15, with at least 2.5 hours on laws common to all lines. NAC 684A.200 adds a currency rule: the course must have been completed *"within 2 years immediately preceding the date of the application."* By NAC 684A.116 the requirement reaches all four license types.

Now chase the authority, because that is where it gets interesting. The regulations come from R028-18, effective 1 July 2018, whose authority string cites NRS 679B.130, NRS 684A.070 and NRS 684A.235. NRS 679B.130 is the Commissioner's general rulemaking power. NRS 684A.235 reads in its entirety: *"The Commissioner may promulgate reasonable regulations as are necessary or proper to carry out the purposes of this chapter."* Also general.

And NRS 684A.070 does not help at all. It contains no education requirement, and its only express rulemaking grant is subsection 3(c) — regulations concerning the procedures for obtaining fingerprint and criminal-history information. NRS 684A.100 requires an examination, not a course. So no Nevada statute requires adjuster prelicensing education; the 20 hours rests on general rulemaking authority.

Two Exams, a Scaled 70, and Question Counts Nobody Publishes

NRS 684A.100 requires each applicant to *"before applying for the license, personally take and pass"* a written examination — unless the applicant is a nonresident who has passed an adjuster examination in, and currently holds a license in good standing in, the home state.

The vendor is Pearson VUE, and there are two adjuster examinations:

Exam 15 — NV Property and Casualty Adjuster, 2 hours. Taken by independent, company and public adjusters. Exam 16 — NV Workers Compensation Adjuster, 1 hour. Taken by independent, company and staff adjusters. A staff adjuster sits for 16 only. A public adjuster sits for 15 only.

The passing score is 70 — but read it carefully. NAC 684A.300: an applicant *"must attain a score of 70 or more points in order to pass."* Points, not percent. Pearson's handbook describes Nevada as using *"a scaled cut of 70"* for all examinations except bail. Two differently sourced instruments land on the same number, and neither of them says "percent."

The number changed in 2018. R028-18 amended the predecessor regulation to move the passing score from 80 to 70, effective 1 July 2018. Any material citing 80 predates that change.

Question counts are not published. Pearson's handbook gives the time limits and the fee but no scored-question counts for either adjuster examination, and no Nevada content outline supplies them. This guide states that as the finding rather than repeating a number from a vendor site.

The examination fee is $37 for a single-line exam. Note that this is a vendor price — Nevada's fee statutes contain no adjuster examination line at all.

Required — but Only of Residents

NRS 684A.070(2): *"A natural person who is a resident of this State applying for a license must, as part of his or her application and at the applicant's own expense: (a) Arrange to have a complete set of his or her fingerprints taken by a law enforcement agency or other authorized entity acceptable to the Commissioner; and (b) Submit to the Commissioner [a completed fingerprint card and written permission] … for submission to the Federal Bureau of Investigation."*

Read the trigger clause. The duty attaches to *"a natural person who is a resident of this State."* It is not a duty on every applicant.

Nonresidents are licensed under NRS 684A.115, which conditions the license on home-state good standing, fees, application and reciprocity — and imposes no fingerprint requirement. So a nonresident adjuster licensed in Nevada has not been fingerprinted by Nevada.

Business entities are not fingerprinted either. NRS 684A.080 contains no fingerprint provision.

So the correct statement is: Nevada fingerprints resident natural persons, at their own expense, and nobody else. That is a three-way distinction — resident individuals, nonresident individuals, entities — and most summaries collapse it into a single yes or no.

The Division adds an administrative detail: prints are *"valid for six months only."* That does not appear in NRS or NAC chapter 684A, so treat it as an agency practice rather than a legal rule.

$185, and Three Published Lines That Do Not Trace

NRS 680B.010(8), in its entirety, is the adjuster fee statute: *"Adjusters', as defined in NRS 684A.030, licenses and renewals: (a) Application and license … $125 (b) Triennial renewal of each license … 125."* Two lines. That is all of it.

NRS 680C.110 adds a separate $60 initial and $60 triennial charge — but it names only independent and public adjusters.

So how do company and staff adjusters pay anything? Through NRS 684A.050(2): *"A company adjuster and a staff adjuster shall pay the same fees as provided for an independent adjuster in NRS 680B.010 and 680C.110."* NRS 684A.050 is not only the concurrency bar — its second subsection is the bridge that brings two of the four license types inside the fee statute at all. Without it they would fall through entirely.

The published total is $185, initial and renewal alike, and it reconciles exactly: $125 + $60.

The late-renewal figure also reconciles, once you read the carve-out. NRS 684A.130(2)(a) sets the late fee at *"150 percent of all applicable fees otherwise required, except for any fee required pursuant to NRS 680C.110 and subsection 2 of NRS 684A.050."* The 150 percent therefore applies to the $125 only — $187.50, an increase of $62.50, for a grand total of $247.50.

Fees are not refundable, and two separate statutes say so. NRS 684A.110(2): *"All fees paid by an applicant with an application for a license shall be deemed earned when received and may not be refunded."* NRS 680C.110 repeats it.

Three Years, on a Rolling Month-End Anniversary

NRS 684A.130(1): *"Each license issued or renewed under this chapter continues in force for 3 years unless it is suspended, revoked or otherwise terminated."*

The expiration convention is defined, and it is unusual. NRS 684A.130(7): *"'renewal date' means: (a) For the first renewal of the license, the last day of the month which is 3 years after the month in which the Commissioner originally issued the license. (b) For each renewal after the first, the last day of the month which is 3 years after the month in which the license was last due to be renewed."*

That is a rolling, licensee-specific month-end anchored to the month of issuance. It is not a common statewide date, and it is not a birthday convention. Two adjusters licensed in the same year can have renewal dates eleven months apart.

There is a 30-day grace window, and it has teeth. NRS 684A.130(2): a request received within 30 days after expiration may be accepted if accompanied by (a) the 150 percent fee described in the fees section; (b) the child-support statement; (c) proof of passing an examination unless exempt under NRS 684A.105; and (d) where applicable, a waiver request for military service, extended medical disability or other extenuating circumstance.

NRS 684A.130(3) allows a licensee unable to comply because of *"military service, long-term medical disability or some other extenuating circumstance"* to request a waiver of the requirements and of any examination, fine or sanction.

Two administrative details worth carrying. Address and legal-name changes must be reported within 30 days (subsection 4). And the section does not apply to temporary licenses issued under NRS 684A.150 (subsection 6).

24 Hours per THREE Years — Not per Biennium

NRS 684A.135(1): an adjuster *"must satisfactorily complete a minimum of 24 hours of courses of continuing education, of which 3 hours must be in ethics, which are reported to the Commissioner as a condition for the renewal of his or her license."*

NAC 684A.400 ties the 24 hours to the term: they must be completed *"within the 3-year period before the date of renewal described in NRS 684A.130,"* and *"must be related to the line or lines of insurance for which the licensee holds a license."*

Because the license term is three years, "24 hours per biennium" is wrong — and it is wrong in a way that is hard to catch. The hour count is right and the period is wrong, so the statement overstates the annual burden by fifty percent: the real rate is 8 hours a year, not 12.

The nonresident exemption is conjunctive. NRS 684A.135(2) exempts an individual who *"(a) Holds a nonresident license as an adjuster; and (b) Has met the continuing education requirements of his or her home state."* Both prongs. A nonresident who has not met home-state CE is not exempt.

What Nevada does not have, established by reading NRS 684A.135 and NAC 684A.400 through .450 in full: no sliding scale, no proration by term length, and no first-term reduction or waiver — a first renewal carries the same 24 hours as any other. The only escapes are the nonresident exemption and the NRS 684A.130(3) hardship waiver.

Carry-over is prohibited. NAC 684A.430: a licensee *"may not carry forward to the next renewal period any hours … accumulated during a renewal period in excess of the hours required,"* and credit is given *"only once during a renewal period for each course taken."* Teaching an approved course earns student-equivalent credit, once per course per period (NAC 684A.425). One credit hour = 50 minutes of instruction (NAC 684A.405). Records are kept four years by both sponsors (NAC 684A.415) and licensees (NAC 684A.435).

Emergency Licensing, Inverted Three Ways

First, a correction that matters: NRS 684A.150 is not the catastrophe provision. It is the death-or-disability temporary license, for continuing the business of a licensee who has died or become disabled. The catastrophe mechanism is NRS 684A.060(2) through (7).

NRS 684A.060(3): *"In the event of a catastrophe, an insurer shall notify the Commissioner by an application for the issuance of a temporary emergency license for each individual who is not already licensed in this State and who will act as an emergency adjuster on behalf of the insurer."* The insurer applies, not the adjuster.

NRS 684A.060(4): an individual not already licensed *"but who is otherwise qualified to adjust claims may act as an emergency adjuster and adjust claims if, within 5 days after deployment"* the required filing is made. Work lawfully precedes the paperwork.

Duration — NRS 684A.060(5): the temporary emergency license is valid for *"not more than 90 days unless extended by the Commissioner."*

Qualifications — NRS 684A.060(6): the individual must (a) be at least 18; (b) be *"competent, trustworthy, financially responsible and of good reputation, as determined by the Commissioner"*; and (c) *"never have been convicted of, or entered a plea of guilty, guilty but mentally ill or nolo contendere to, forgery, embezzlement, obtaining money under false pretenses, larceny, extortion or conspiracy to defraud"* and never have committed a ground for refusal under NRS 683A.451.

The fee is $185 — NRS 684A.060(7) requires *"the license fee specified for an adjuster in NRS 680B.010 and, in addition to any other fee or charge, all fees required for an adjuster pursuant to NRS 680C.110."* The same $125 + $60 as a full license.

A Statute With No Frequency Element — a Single Act Is a Violation

NRS 686A.310 is captioned *"Unfair practices in settling claims; liability of insurer for damages."* The caption alone tells you Nevada is not a Commissioner-only state.

The chapeau, in its entirety: *"1. Engaging in any of the following activities is considered to be an unfair practice:"*

That is the whole of it. There is no *"with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice"* qualifier anywhere in NRS 686A.310. Nevada departed from the NAIC model here, and the consequence is that a single act is a violation. In model states that frequency element is the central limiting device.

The enumeration runs from (a) to (p) — sixteen practices. Paragraphs (a) through (k) are the familiar list: misrepresenting policy provisions; failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly; failing to adopt reasonable investigation standards; failing to affirm or deny within a reasonable time after proofs of loss; failing to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements where liability has become reasonably clear; compelling insureds to litigate by offering substantially less than is ultimately recovered; and so on.

The last five are the ones worth memorizing, because several states have no equivalent. (l) failing to settle promptly under one portion of coverage *"in order to influence settlements under other portions"*; (m) failing to comply with NRS 687B.310 to 687B.390 or 687B.410; (n) failing to provide promptly *"a reasonable explanation of the basis in the insurance policy"* for a denial or an offer; (o) *"Advising an insured or claimant not to seek legal counsel"*; and (p) *"Misleading an insured or claimant concerning any applicable statute of limitations."*

Note the drafting asymmetry. Paragraphs (a), (j), (k), (o) and (p) say *"insureds or claimants"*; (n) says only *"an insured"*; (g) says *"a claim by an insured."* The scope of each paragraph differs, and the difference is deliberate.

The Frequency Element Is in the Regulation — and So Are All the Clocks

Nevada's claim-handling deadlines are in NAC 686A.600 through .690, and the scope provision is where the frequency element actually lives.

NAC 686A.600(1): *"NAC 686A.600 to 686A.680, inclusive, define certain minimum standards, violations of which, with a frequency which indicates a general business practice, will be deemed to constitute unfair claims settlement practices."*

Read the range. It governs the regulations only. NRS 686A.310 is not within it, and a regulation cannot narrow a statute. So: a single violation of the STATUTE is actionable; but to convert a breach of the REGULATORY minimum standards into a deemed unfair claims settlement practice, the Division needs frequency indicating a general business practice. Two different tests, one level apart.

Note also NAC 686A.600(2), whose range is different — *"NAC 686A.600 to 686A.690"* — and which excludes policies of surety insurance from the whole block. And NAC 686A.600(3): *"Acts not specified in NAC 686A.600 to 686A.690, inclusive, may also be deemed to be violations of NRS 686A.310."* The regulation is a floor, not a ceiling.

The clocks themselves. Acknowledge a claim within 20 working days, unless payment is made within that time (NAC 686A.665(1)). Respond to a Division inquiry about a claim within 10 working days, extendable by 20 more if requested within the initial period (665(2)). Reply to any other pertinent communication from a claimant within 20 working days (665(3)). Provide claim forms and instructions within 20 working days — and doing so satisfies the acknowledgment duty (665(4)).

Begin an investigation within 20 working days of notice, and mail notice of the items required (NAC 686A.670(1)). Complete the investigation within 30 days of notice unless it cannot reasonably be completed (670(2)). Advise a first-party claimant of acceptance or denial within 30 working days after properly executed proofs of loss, and if accepted, pay within 30 days, with late payment accruing interest under NRS 99.040 (NAC 686A.675(1)). If more time is needed, say so within 30 working days with reasons, and update every 30 days thereafter (675(3)). And if direct negotiations are being delayed, give 60 days' written notice before the statute of limitations expires (675(5)).

Protected by the Regulation, Remedy-less Under the Statute

This is the cleanest structural story in Nevada claims law, and it turns on a definition.

NAC 686A.620 defines "claimant" as one who *"includes a first-party claimant, a third-party claimant, or both, and designated legal representatives and members of the claimant's immediate family designated by the claimant."*

So the regulatory deadlines that use the word "claimant" reach third-party claimants. NAC 686A.665 (acknowledgment, and replies to communications) and NAC 686A.670 (investigation) both use *"claimant."* A third-party claimant is entitled to a 20-working-day acknowledgment and a 20-working-day start to the investigation.

But NAC 686A.675(1) — the accept-or-deny clock — uses "first-party claimant." That protection does not extend to the third party.

And the statute's damages remedy runs only to the insured. NRS 686A.310(2) makes an insurer *"liable to its insured."* A third-party claimant has no private action under it.

The Legislature confirmed that structurally in 2005. NRS 686A.325 requires written notice to a claimant when an insurer pays $5,000 or more to the claimant's representative in a third-party liability claim — and subsection 2 provides that failure to give the notice *"does not: (a) Create … a cause of action for any natural person or entity other than the Commissioner. (b) Establish … a defense for any party to any cause of action."*

A rare, deliberately remedy-less mandate — and a double negative. The claimant gets no action, and cannot use the failure to unwind a settlement or defeat a release either. When Nevada's Legislature wanted to address third-party claimants in this subchapter, it did so expressly — and expressly denied them a private action.

Liable to Its Insured — and *Gunny* Bars Everyone Else

NRS 686A.310(2), in full: *"In addition to any rights or remedies available to the Commissioner, an insurer is liable to its insured for any damages sustained by the insured as a result of the commission of any act set forth in subsection 1 as an unfair practice."*

The text is doubly limiting — liable *"to its insured,"* for damages sustained *"by the insured."* First party only.

And note what is NOT there. There is no *"including consequential damages"* language, no attorney-fee provision, no multiplier, and no statutory penalty payable to the insured. The remedy is *"any damages sustained by the insured"* and nothing more.

It is self-executing. Nothing conditions the insured's suit on a Commissioner proceeding, a finding, an exhaustion step or a referral. The opening phrase *"in addition to any rights or remedies available to the Commissioner"* confirms the two tracks run in parallel.

But there is a corollary worth carrying. NRS 686A.170 lets the Commissioner reach practices not defined in the chapter, after a hearing and written findings. A practice reached only through .170 supports Commissioner action but generates no private claim, because .310(2) is keyed to *"any act set forth in subsection 1."*

On third-party claimants: *Gunny v. Allstate Insurance Co.*, Docket No. 22318, Supreme Court of Nevada, decided 13 May 1992 — *"Greg has no private right of action as a third-party claimant under NRS 686A.310."* The statute was last amended in 1991, so *Gunny* construes the text still in force. That is the strongest available support for its continuing authority.

Thirty Days — With a Trigger So Narrow It Is Usually Misreported

NRS 686A.300 is Nevada's motor-vehicle payment provision, and it is the one figure fifty-state charts most often get wrong.

Subsection 2: a delay is failure to issue a check or draft, payable to the shop or jointly to the insured and the shop, *"within 30 days after the insurer's receipt of the statement of charges for repairs which have been satisfactorily completed."*

Now read every condition, because all of them must be met. The insurer issues insurance covering damage to a motor vehicle; a statement of charges under NRS 487.6893 is received; from a garage or licensed body shop previously authorized by the insured to perform the repairs; for repairs that have been satisfactorily completed; and the clock runs from the insurer's receipt of the statement of charges.

So this is not a generic auto-claim payment clock. It is a shop-payment clock that runs on completed work. It says nothing about when a claim must be decided, when an offer must be made, or when an insured must be paid directly.

"30 days" carries no "working" or "business" modifier — calendar days. The absence of the modifier is itself the evidence.

And the $300 figure is not a payment threshold. Subsection 3 requires repair by a garage or licensed body shop where the vehicle is subject to a security interest or the legal owner differs from the registered owner — unless the insurer has declared a total loss, or the total charge is $300 or less. It is an exception to a mandatory-repair rule, not a claim threshold.

The Test Is Conjunctive — and the 'Or' Belongs Inside the Second Prong

Nevada has a common-law bad-faith tort alongside the statutory claim, and its elements are stated two different ways in the case law. Blending them produces a test that is dramatically easier to prove than the real one.

The elements test. *Powers v. United Services Automobile Association*, Docket No. 26794, Supreme Court of Nevada, decided 16 July 1998: *"To establish a prima facie case of bad-faith refusal to pay an insurance claim, the plaintiff must establish that the insurer had no reasonable basis for disputing coverage, AND that the insurer knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that there was no reasonable basis for disputing coverage."*

The shorthand, from *Miller*: *"an actual or implied awareness of the absence of a reasonable basis for denying benefits."*

Here is the resolution. There are two prongs joined by AND — (i) no reasonable basis, and (ii) the insurer's state of mind about that absence. The "or" belongs INSIDE prong (ii): knowledge or reckless disregard; actual or implied awareness. The "or" is never between the prongs.

The tort is not limited to first-party claim denial. *Allstate Insurance Co. v. Miller*, Docket No. 49760, Supreme Court of Nevada, decided 30 July 2009, is a third-party failure-to-settle case: *"A bad-faith action applies to more than just an insurer's denial or delay in paying a claim,"* and *"An insurer's failure to adequately inform an insured of a settlement offer may also constitute grounds for a bad-faith claim."* The standard: *"An insurer must equally consider the insured's interests and its own."*

But only a party in contractual privity may sue. *United Fire Insurance Co. v. McClelland*, Docket 18705, Supreme Court of Nevada, decided 6 September 1989 reversed a non-contracting family member's bad-faith recovery because *"a contractual basis did not exist between her and the insurer."* So a third-party claimant cannot sue the tortfeasor's insurer for bad faith — which is exactly why *Miller* and *Gunny* are consistent. *Miller* was Allstate's own insured, suing over how his liability claim was handled.

Two Inversions — and Almost Nobody Charts the Second

NRS 42.005(1) sets the general caps: punitive damages may not exceed three times the compensatory award where compensatory damages are $100,000 or more, or $300,000 where they are less than $100,000. The burden is clear and convincing evidence of *"oppression, fraud or malice, express or implied."*

Inversion one — NRS 42.005(2)(b). The caps *"do not apply to an action brought against … an insurer who acts in bad faith regarding its obligations to provide insurance coverage."* Punitive damages against a bad-faith insurer in Nevada are uncapped as a matter of state statute.

Read the clause, because it is narrower than "insurers are exempt." The bad faith must concern coverage obligations. An insurer sued over unfair marketing, agent misconduct or a premium dispute is not within (2)(b) and remains capped.

Inversion two — NRS 42.005(5), and this one is almost never charted: *"For the purposes of an action brought against an insurer who acts in bad faith regarding its obligations to provide insurance coverage, the definitions set forth in NRS 42.001 are not applicable and the corresponding provisions of the common law apply."*

NRS 42.001's definitions are markedly harder than the common law. *"Malice"* requires conduct intended to injure or *"despicable conduct"* engaged in with conscious disregard. *"Oppression"* requires *"despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship."* *"Conscious disregard"* requires *"a willful and deliberate failure to act."* A bad-faith insurer defendant does not get the benefit of any of them. The common-law meanings apply instead — a materially lower bar for the plaintiff.

So Nevada insurers face a double inversion: no cap, and no definitional protection. Both come from the same statute and both must be stated together, because they cut the same way.

You Can Be Sued Personally — by Express Statute

This is the cleanest answer in Nevada adjuster law, and most fifty-state charts get it wrong.

NRS 684A.035: *"1. The provisions of NRS 683A.341 and 686A.310 apply to adjusters. 2. For the purposes of subsection 1, unless the context requires that a section apply only to producers of insurance or insurers, any reference in those sections to 'producer of insurance' or 'insurer' must be replaced by a reference to 'adjuster.'"*

Subsection 2 is a textual substitution rule, and it is what makes personal liability work. Apply it to NRS 686A.310(2) and the section reads: *"…an adjuster is liable to its insured for any damages sustained by the insured as a result of the commission of any act set forth in subsection 1 as an unfair practice."*

So an individual adjuster can be sued personally in Nevada for damages under NRS 686A.310, and the entire (a) through (p) list binds adjusters directly. The Legislature said so expressly in 2011. Most states reach adjusters only through the insurer, if at all.

Note what the statute does NOT do. It does not deem an adjuster to be an insurer, and it does not import the rest of chapter 686A — only NRS 683A.341 and NRS 686A.310. Two published summaries garble this: one cites the wrong section entirely, and one describes it as expanding the definition of *"insurer"* and limits it to *independent* adjusters. It is neither, and the statute says *"adjusters"* without distinguishing among the four types.

Common-law bad faith against an adjuster personally is a different question, and the likely answer is no — the tort requires privity (*McClelland*), and an adjuster has none with the insured. So the probable Nevada position is: no common-law bad-faith tort against an adjuster, but yes a statutory claim under NRS 686A.310 via NRS 684A.035. That is an inference from two instruments rather than a holding, and this guide presents it as such.

UM Is Mandatory, UIM Is Only Offered — and the Measure Is Damages

Minimum limits are 25/50/20 — NRS 485.185: $25,000 bodily injury per person, $50,000 per crash, $20,000 property damage. Read the trigger: the duty runs to the owner of a vehicle *"registered or required to be registered in this State,"* who must *"continuously provide"* the insurance. A registration-based trigger, not an operation-based one. Mopeds are excepted. The figures were set by SB 308 (2017), effective 1 July 2018.

UM and UIM are two different statutes with two different mandates, and this is the most consequential auto distinction in the state.

UM is mandatory — NRS 690B.020. *"No policy … may be delivered or issued for delivery in this State unless coverage is provided"* — a prohibition on issuance. It may be rejected in writing, on a form furnished by the insurer describing the coverage rejected. The amount must be not less than the chapter 485 minimums but may not exceed the insured's own bodily injury limits — a floor and a ceiling. It covers hit-and-run expressly.

UIM need only be OFFERED — NRS 687B.145(2). The insurer *"must offer, on a form approved by the Commissioner"* underinsured coverage equal to the insured's bodily injury limits, and *"the insured may purchase the coverage by requesting it in writing."* Acceptance by written request, not rejection by written form — the opposite default from UM. And: *"Each renewal must include a copy of the form offering such coverage."*

The UIM measure is damages-based, not difference-in-limits. The coverage *"enables the insured … to recover up to the limits of the insured's own coverage any amount of damages … to the extent that those damages exceed the limits of the coverage for bodily injury carried by that owner or operator."* The quantity that must exceed the tortfeasor's limits is the insured's DAMAGES — the insured's own limits are only the cap. So a claimant with 25/50 UIM facing a 25/50 tortfeasor is not automatically out; the question is whether damages exceed $25,000.

Stacking: NRS 687B.145(1) authorizes anti-stacking clauses subject to a drafting standard. Where two or more coverages apply, recovery *"may equal but not exceed the higher of the applicable limits,"* prorated — and such limiting provisions *"must be in clear language and be prominently displayed in the policy, binder or endorsement."* Absent a compliant provision, the higher-limits-and-proration default governs.

A 65% Definition — but It Is a Titling Rule, Not a Settlement Trigger

Nevada has a real percentage, and the fabricated-threshold pattern that appeared in other states did not recur here. But the percentage does not do the job most people assume.

NRS 487.790 defines a "total loss vehicle" as a motor vehicle "of a type which is subject to registration" that has been wrecked, destroyed or otherwise damaged such that the cost of repair is 65 percent or more of the fair market value of the vehicle immediately before the damage. ⚠️ The registration element is part of the definition — an unregistrable vehicle is outside the section entirely.

Three things are excluded from the repair-cost calculation: painting; replacing electronic components in accordance with manufacturer specifications; and towing. Those exclusions are part of the definition and they move the arithmetic.

And there are four carve-outs from the definition: a nonrepairable vehicle; a vehicle 10 model years old or older which — "regardless of cost" — requires replacement of only the hood, the trunk lid, a fender, two or fewer of {doors, grill assembly, bumper assembly, headlight assembly, taillight assembly}, or any combination of those; a vehicle whose repair cost is below 65 percent; and a stolen-and-recovered vehicle with no structural damage missing only tires, wheels or audio or video equipment. ⚠️ And subsection 3 supplies the trigger for the age test: "the model year of manufacture is calculated based on a year beginning on January 1 of the calendar year in which the damage occurs."

Now the point. NRS 487.790 sits in chapter 487 — the DMV's chapter on repair, removal and disposal of vehicles. It is a TITLING and BRANDING definition. NRS 487.770 defines a *"salvage vehicle"* and contains no percentage of its own — it inherits .790's. NRS 487.800 is transactional: the insurer's duty attaches when *"an insurance company acquires a motor vehicle as a result of a settlement in which the motor vehicle is determined to be a salvage vehicle,"* and then runs 180 days to forward the endorsed title, with an *"as soon as practicable"* fallback if the owner does not supply title within 30 days.

Nothing in chapter 487 obliges an insurer to declare a total loss at 65 percent, and nothing forbids totaling below it. The claim-settlement rule is NAC 686A.680, and it contains no percentage at all — it requires either a replacement vehicle with transfer costs covered, or a cash settlement on comparable-vehicle valuation using comparables *"within the most previous 90 days,"* with deductions *"measurable, discernible, itemized and specified as to the amount"* and the vehicle *"restored to its condition before the loss at no additional cost to the claimant."*

Wildfire May Now Be Excluded — and a Long List of Rules Nevada Does Not Have

The biggest recent change in Nevada property insurance is NRS 691A.035, added by AB 376 (2025) and effective 1 January 2026.

Subsection 1: *"An insurer that issues a policy of property insurance may exclude the peril of wildfire from the coverage provided under the policy."* Subsection 2: an insurer *"may … issue a policy of property insurance that solely covers the peril of wildfire."* Subsection 4 defines wildfire as *"an unplanned and uncontrolled fire in an area of combustible vegetation that originated from outside any residential or commercial property."*

Read what the section does NOT do, because it is the tested part. There is no requirement that an insurer excluding wildfire must offer standalone wildfire coverage — subsection 2 is permissive. There is no notice or disclosure duty to the policyholder about the exclusion. And there is no Commissioner approval requirement for the exclusion itself — approval is required only under subsection 3 to vary the statutory definition of wildfire.

Now the negatives, all established by enumerating the chapters. Nevada prescribes no standard fire policy. It has no valued policy law. It has no matching rule, no ordinance-or-law mandate, no statutory actual cash value definition and no depreciation-of-labor rule — none appears in NRS 691A, NRS 687B, NAC 686A, NAC 687B or NAC 690B. There is no hail, wind or catastrophe deductible regulation.

And there is no appraisal statute. Appraisal in Nevada is a contractual remedy only, confirmed across six enumerated chapters. No Nevada authority addresses whether an appraisal panel may decide causation, so this guide states no rule on appraisal scope.

Nevada does have a residual-market framework — NRS 686B.180 to 686B.370, "Essential Insurance," including the Nevada Essential Insurance Association, which the Commissioner is to approve a plan for *"when essential coverage is not available in the market."* NRS 687B.370 even makes certain cancellation and nonrenewal notices ineffective unless they carry information about applying through such a plan.

Six Years on the Policy — and No Statute Voids the Suit Clause

NRS 11.190 sets the periods. The one that matters for a policy is six years — *"An action upon a contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing."* Also: four years for a contract not founded on a writing; three years for *"taking, detaining or injuring personal property"*; and two years for personal injury or wrongful death.

Does Nevada void contractual changes to a limitation period? No. Chapter 11 was searched for *"agreement," "contract," "shorten"* and *"waive"* and contains no such prohibition. And NRS chapter 687B was enumerated in full — 687B.010 through 687B.450 — and no section governs suit-limitation clauses, contractual limitation periods, or time to sue. The nearest provisions are 687B.140 (standard provisions), 687B.120 (form filing) and 687B.130 (grounds for disapproval), which are general form-content authority.

So the twelve-month suit clause printed in a Nevada policy is not statutorily void. That is worth stating plainly because it is the reverse of the position in some states, where a general limitations statute nullifies the clause in every policy.

But do not read that as "enforceable, full stop." Whether a given clause survives is a case-law question about reasonableness, tolling during claim investigation, and notice — and Nevada's decisional law on the point is outside what this guide verifies.

And a regulation bears directly on how an insurer may use the period against a claimant. NAC 686A.675(5) forbids delaying settlement negotiations *"until the claimant's rights may be affected by a statute of limitations"* without 60 days' written notice before it expires. NAC 686A.675(6) restricts statements about a third-party claimant's rights that reference form deadlines, except as to the limitation period itself.

Practical effect for an adjuster: the clock is long, the policy clause is not automatically void, and running the clock down quietly is itself a regulated practice — reinforced by NRS 686A.310(1)(p), which makes *"misleading an insured or claimant concerning any applicable statute of limitations"* an enumerated unfair practice.

Three Tiers, No Claimant Deductible, and a 25-Month Tail

NRS 687A.060(1)(a) makes the Association obligated for covered claims existing before the determination of insolvency and arising within 30 days after it — or before policy expiration or replacement — limited to three tiers:

Workers' compensation — *"the entire amount of the claim"* — UNCAPPED. Unearned premium — not more than $10,000 for each policy. All other covered claims — the limit specified in the policy or $300,000, whichever is less, for each occurrence.

And there is an overriding ceiling: NRS 687A.060(1)(b) — the Association is not obligated to pay *"an amount in excess of the obligation of the insolvent insurer under the policy."*

Nevada omits the NAIC's $100 claimant deductible entirely. The obligation section contains no reduction clause and the definition of *"covered claim"* contains no minimum-amount exclusion. The Association pays from the first dollar up to the tier cap. That is a genuine deviation from the model and a likely distractor.

Net worth exclusions run in both directions. A first-party claim is excluded where the insured's net worth exceeds $10,000,000, and a third-party claim where it exceeds $25,000,000, each measured on 31 December of the year immediately preceding the insolvency. And Nevada also imports other states' bars — excluding any claim on behalf of a person with net worth greater than the guaranty association law of the claimant's state of residence allows.

The claim tail is 25 months, and it has two anchors. A claim is excluded if filed *"(1) more than 25 months after the date of the order of liquidation; or (2) after the final date set by the court for the filing of claims … whichever is earlier."* Assessments on member insurers are capped at 2 percent of prior-year net direct written premiums.

Two Units, Mandatory Reporting, and No Immunity in the Subchapter

Nevada runs two separate fraud units, both in the Attorney General's office, and they are not interchangeable. The insurance Fraud Control Unit is created by NRS 228.412. The industrial insurance Fraud Control Unit is NRS 228.420.

NRS 228.420 gives the Attorney General *"primary jurisdiction"* over criminal violations of the listed industrial-insurance sections and *"any fraud in the administration of chapter 616A, 616B, 616C, 616D or 617,"* with power to inspect the records of *"any self-insured employer, association of self-insured public or private employers, or private carrier."* The investigative jurisdiction expressly reaches carriers.

Reporting is MANDATORY. NRS 686A.283 imposes the duty — a marked contrast with states whose statutes say only *"may report."* No deadline is stated in the section, and no immunity provision appears in this subchapter.

NRS 686A.285 separately requires an insurer to report a suspicion that a loss to the insured was caused by other than an accidental or natural occurrence — the arson and suspicious-loss report.

Penalties: insurance fraud is a category D felony under NRS 686A.291 and NRS 193.130, with NRS 686A.292 adding restitution and payment of Fraud Control Unit expenses.

No general fraud warning statement is required. Only two narrow health-billing forms carry one under NRS 686A.315 — the hospital form prescribed under NRS 449.485, and the HCFA-1500. And NRS 686A.315(3) forecloses the obvious defense: failure to provide the statement *"is not a defense in a prosecution for insurance fraud pursuant to NRS 686A.291."* There is also no antifraud plan requirement and no special investigation unit requirement.

Thirty Days, Treble Damages, No Presumption — and No Bad-Faith Action at All

NRS 616C.065(1): within 30 days after notification of an industrial accident the insurer must either accept the claim, notify the claimant and commence payment, or deny and notify the claimant and the Administrator.

NRS 616C.065(4): if an insurer *"unreasonably delays or refuses to pay the claim within 30 days,"* it shall pay upon order of the Administrator an additional amount equal to three times the amount specified in the order as refused or unreasonably delayed.

Read the conditions on that treble penalty, because it is the most misstated Nevada number in circulation. The Administrator must find the delay or refusal unreasonable, and must issue an order. It is not automatic on day thirty-one.

And there is no presumption in either direction. NRS 616C.065(7): *"The failure of the insurer to indicate the acceptance or denial of a claim for a part of the body or condition does not constitute a denial or acceptance thereof."* Nevada creates neither deemed acceptance nor deemed denial, so the usual follow-up question — rebuttable or conclusive? — simply does not arise.

Physician choice is a panel with a managed-care override — neither "employer directs" nor "free choice." The Administrator maintains a panel, updated on or before 1 July each year (NRS 616C.090(1)). If the insurer has no managed-care contract, the employee may choose from the panel (090(3)). If it has one, the employee must choose pursuant to that contract (090(4)). The employee gets one alternative choice within 90 days of injury without approval; after 90 days, changes need the insurer's approval or an order. A change request must be granted or denied within 10 days, and on a specialist referral the employee selects from the insurer's list within 14 days. NRS 616C.087 calls physician choice *"a substantive right and substantive benefit."*

The third-party lien was rewritten in 2025 and most published sources are stale. After *AmTrust North America v. Vasquez* (Nev. Sup. Ct., 19 September 2024) held the lien reached total proceeds with no cost sharing, SB 258 (2025), effective on signature 31 May 2025, added NRS 616C.215(7): the insurer recovers the lesser of the reduced lien or one-third of the total amount recovered; the lien must be reduced by one-half of the employee's reasonable COSTS on a verified itemized memorandum; and future-payment offsets may reduce each payment by not more than one-third. Half the costs — costs, not attorney's fees. No pro-rata fee reduction and no made-whole doctrine, but the one-third cap is a functional substitute.

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