Nevada · Insurance Adjuster Sample Interactive Mind Map
Nevada Adjuster Regulations
A visual breakdown of the Nevada rules an adjuster is tested on — including the vocabulary inversion in the four credentials, the statute with no frequency element, the two punitive-damages carve-outs, and the damages-based UIM measure.
Nevada gives an adjuster a great deal of law — and then inverts the vocabulary. There is no single adjuster license: there are four, they are separate instruments, and § 684A.050(1) bars holding more than one at a time. Two of the four are not what their names suggest. The person almost every other state calls a staff adjuster — the carrier’s own salaried employee — is in Nevada a company adjuster, and that license is voluntary: § 684A.040(4) switches off the licensure mandate, the gross misdemeanor and the $1,000 fine for any salaried employee of an insurer. What Nevada calls a staff adjuster works for a third-party administrator and handles nothing but workers’ compensation.
The claims law runs on two levels, and the levels have different rules. The statute, § 686A.310, enumerates sixteen unfair practices — including advising a claimant not to seek legal counsel and misleading anyone about a limitations period — and contains no general business practice element at all, so a single act is a violation. It also creates a private right of action in terms: an insurer “is liable to its insured.” The regulations, NAC 686A.600 to .690, carry every numeric deadline, and it is there, in the scope provision, that the frequency qualifier lives — governing only the regulations themselves. Two tests, one level apart.
Those levels explain Nevada’s exposure. Punitive damages against a bad-faith insurer are uncapped under § 42.005(2)(b), and — a provision almost nobody charts — § 42.005(5) switches off the harder statutory definitions too, so the common-law meanings of malice and oppression apply instead. By another express statute, § 684A.035, an individual adjuster can be sued personally under the whole of § 686A.310. But workers’ compensation runs the opposite way: § 616D.030 abolished the comp bad-faith action outright in 1995, and administrative fines are the exclusive remedy. On the auto side, UM is mandatory while UIM need only be offered — with opposite written-consent defaults — the UIM measure is damages-based rather than difference-in-limits, comparative fault is measured against the combined fault of all defendants, and the famous 65% is a titling definition that does not govern claim settlement at all. Ten scenario questions at the end, several built on what published Nevada material gets wrong.
Nevada has FOUR separate adjuster licenses, you may hold exactly one — and two of the four are not what their names suggest.
§ 684A.050(1) bars being “licensed concurrently under the same license or separate licenses as more than one such type of adjuster.” The person almost every other state calls a staff adjuster is here a company adjuster — and that license is VOLUNTARY. Nevada’s staff adjuster works for a third-party administrator and handles nothing but workers’ compensation.
§ 684A.050(1) bars being “licensed concurrently under the same license or separate licenses as more than one such type of adjuster.” The person almost every other state calls a staff adjuster is here a company adjuster — and that license is VOLUNTARY. Nevada’s staff adjuster works for a third-party administrator and handles nothing but workers’ compensation.
| Credential | Defined at | Licensure |
|---|---|---|
| Independent adjuster | § 684A.030(1) | REQUIRED — contracts as an independent contractor, treated as one for tax purposes, may handle comp |
| Public adjuster | § 684A.030(2) | REQUIRED — ⚠ may NEVER handle workers’ compensation |
| Company adjuster | § 684A.030(3) | ⚠ VOLUNTARY — the carrier’s own salaried employee |
| Staff adjuster | § 684A.030(4) | ⚠ REQUIRED — a WORKERS’ COMP role at a registered TPA |
| Temporary emergency | § 684A.060(3)–(7) | Catastrophe route — 90 days |
| Temporary independent | § 684A.150 | ⚠ DEATH OR DISABILITY — not the catastrophe provision |
| Business entity | § 684A.080 | Available |
| — | ⚠ ABOLISHED 1 January 2020 — zero occurrences in the chapter |
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The vocabulary is swapped — an imported answer is wrong in both directions
§ 684A.030(3): “‘Company adjuster’ means a salaried employee of an insurer who: (a) Investigates, negotiates or settles property, casualty or surety claims, including, without limitation, workers’ compensation claims; and (b) Obtains a license pursuant to this chapter.”
§ 684A.030(4): “‘Staff adjuster’ means a person who investigates, negotiates or settles workers’ compensation claims under the authority of a third-party administrator who holds a certificate of registration issued by the Commissioner pursuant to NRS 6·8·3A.0·8·5·2·4.”
⚠ In every other state, “staff adjuster” means the carrier’s own employee. In Nevada that person is a COMPANY adjuster. This is not a state that merely differs from the national pattern — it swaps two terms, so a candidate who imports the ordinary meanings answers two questions wrong and never sees why.
§ 684A.030(4): “‘Staff adjuster’ means a person who investigates, negotiates or settles workers’ compensation claims under the authority of a third-party administrator who holds a certificate of registration issued by the Commissioner pursuant to NRS 6·8·3A.0·8·5·2·4.”
⚠ In every other state, “staff adjuster” means the carrier’s own employee. In Nevada that person is a COMPANY adjuster. This is not a state that merely differs from the national pattern — it swaps two terms, so a candidate who imports the ordinary meanings answers two questions wrong and never sees why.
The company adjuster license is VOLUNTARY — three textual proofsPROOF 1 — the definition is circular on purpose. § 684A.030(3)(b) makes “Obtains a license pursuant to this chapter” an element of the definition. You do not become a company adjuster and then get licensed — you become one BY getting licensed. So nobody is ever an unlicensed company adjuster and the mandate can never bite. PROOF 2 — § 684A.040(4): “A salaried employee of an insurer who investigates, negotiates or settles workers’ compensation claims may, but is not required to, obtain a license as a company adjuster… The provisions of subsections 1, 2 and 3 do not apply to a salaried employee of an insurer.” ⚠ That last sentence is broader than the first — it switches off the licensure mandate, the GROSS MISDEMEANOR and the $1,0·0·0 fine for ANY salaried employee, not just the comp ones. PROOF 3 — § 684A.020(2)(c) excludes a salaried insurer employee from the definition of “adjuster” unless the employee both handles comp and obtains a license. Conjunctive. Fail the second prong and you are not an adjuster at all.
✅ COMPANY ADJUSTER — defined to CREATE an optional credential
The carrier’s salaried employee
Licensure is an element of the definition
§ 684A.040(4): “may, but is not required to”
Mandate, misdemeanor and fine all switch off
Result: the credential is ELECTIVE
⛔ STAFF ADJUSTER — defined to CLOSE a loophole
Works under a registered third-party administrator
Workers’ compensation only
§ 684A.020(2)(q) excludes TPA adjusters “unless the person… settles workers’ compensation claims”
The “unless” pulls them back IN
Result: the credential is COMPULSORY
Two boundaries the exam matrix proves structurallyPearson runs exactly two adjuster examinations. Exam 15 — NV Property and Casualty Adjuster, 2 hours, taken by independent, company and public adjusters. Exam 16 — NV Workers Compensation Adjuster, 1 hour, taken by independent, company and staff adjusters. ⚠ A STAFF adjuster sits for 16 ONLY. A PUBLIC adjuster sits for 15 ONLY — matching the exclusion written into § 684A.030(2), which says the term “does not include an adjuster who investigates, negotiates or settles workers’ compensation claims.” If you can reconstruct the exam matrix you can reconstruct the definitions.
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Nevada’s largest exemption is not in the section captioned “Exceptions”
§ 684A.060 is captioned “Exceptions to requirement of licensing” and covers agents, catastrophes and temporary licensure. The blanket carve-out for salaried insurer employees is in § 684A.040(4) — inside the section that creates the requirement and the penalties. A candidate who reads only the exceptions section will conclude that Nevada licenses staff adjusters. It does not.
⚠ AND § 684A.060(2) ADDS ANOTHER WITH AN UNUSUAL TRIGGER: “No license shall be required of a nonresident salaried adjuster for the adjustment in this state of one or more losses arising out of a catastrophe… where such losses are designated to be a catastrophe by responsible insurance associations or the Commissioner.” A PRIVATE BODY can trigger it. No governmental declaration is required at all, and one of the two permitted designators is not a government actor — unusual even among states that dispense with a declaration.
⚠ AND § 684A.055 IS A FLAT BAR NOBODY EXPECTS: “No person who is engaged in the business of repairing the bodies of automobiles may: 1. Be licensed pursuant to this chapter. 2. Own a controlling interest in a business entity licensed pursuant to NRS 684A.080.” Not a disclosure rule and not a consent rule — a body-shop owner cannot cure it by disclosing. The license is simply unavailable.
⚠ AND § 684A.060(2) ADDS ANOTHER WITH AN UNUSUAL TRIGGER: “No license shall be required of a nonresident salaried adjuster for the adjustment in this state of one or more losses arising out of a catastrophe… where such losses are designated to be a catastrophe by responsible insurance associations or the Commissioner.” A PRIVATE BODY can trigger it. No governmental declaration is required at all, and one of the two permitted designators is not a government actor — unusual even among states that dispense with a declaration.
⚠ AND § 684A.055 IS A FLAT BAR NOBODY EXPECTS: “No person who is engaged in the business of repairing the bodies of automobiles may: 1. Be licensed pursuant to this chapter. 2. Own a controlling interest in a business entity licensed pursuant to NRS 684A.080.” Not a disclosure rule and not a consent rule — a body-shop owner cannot cure it by disclosing. The license is simply unavailable.
Nevada licenses no life or health adjusters at all§ 684A.010: “This chapter applies to adjusters only as defined in NRS 684A.020, and does not apply to any person who adjusts or settles claims relating to life or health coverage or annuities. This chapter may be cited as the Nevada Insurance Adjusters Law.” ⚠ So the credential is functionally a property and casualty credential even though nothing in its name says so. A question asking what license a Nevada life claims examiner needs has the answer none.
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Catastrophe adjusters — and § 684A.150 is NOT the mechanism
§ 684A.150 is the DEATH-OR-DISABILITY temporary license, for continuing the business of a licensee who has died or become disabled. The catastrophe mechanism is § 684A.060(2)–(7).
⚠ THE INSURER APPLIES, NOT THE ADJUSTER. § 684A.060(3): “In the event of a catastrophe, an insurer shall notify the Commissioner by an application for the issuance of a temporary emergency license for each individual who is not already licensed in this State…”
⚠ WORK MAY LAWFULLY PRECEDE THE FILING. § 684A.060(4): an individual not already licensed “but who is otherwise qualified to adjust claims may act as an emergency adjuster and adjust claims if, within 5 days after deployment…” the filing is made.
Term: not more than 90 days unless extended (subsection 5). Minimum age 18; “competent, trustworthy, financially responsible and of good reputation”; and ⚠ NEVER convicted of or pleaded to “forgery, embezzlement, obtaining money under false pretenses, larceny, extortion or conspiracy to defraud” (subsection 6). Fee: $1·8·5 — the same as a full license (subsection 7).
⚠ AND A TENSION ON THE FACE OF THE STATUTE. Subsection 2 says no license is required of a nonresident salaried adjuster; subsection 3 says the insurer shall apply for one for each individual not already licensed. Read (2) as the narrower carve-out and (3) as the general rule — but a candidate who notices the friction is not misreading anything.
⚠ THE INSURER APPLIES, NOT THE ADJUSTER. § 684A.060(3): “In the event of a catastrophe, an insurer shall notify the Commissioner by an application for the issuance of a temporary emergency license for each individual who is not already licensed in this State…”
⚠ WORK MAY LAWFULLY PRECEDE THE FILING. § 684A.060(4): an individual not already licensed “but who is otherwise qualified to adjust claims may act as an emergency adjuster and adjust claims if, within 5 days after deployment…” the filing is made.
Term: not more than 90 days unless extended (subsection 5). Minimum age 18; “competent, trustworthy, financially responsible and of good reputation”; and ⚠ NEVER convicted of or pleaded to “forgery, embezzlement, obtaining money under false pretenses, larceny, extortion or conspiracy to defraud” (subsection 6). Fee: $1·8·5 — the same as a full license (subsection 7).
⚠ AND A TENSION ON THE FACE OF THE STATUTE. Subsection 2 says no license is required of a nonresident salaried adjuster; subsection 3 says the insurer shall apply for one for each individual not already licensed. Read (2) as the narrower carve-out and (3) as the general rule — but a candidate who notices the friction is not misreading anything.
Nevada’s licensing numbers are all slightly off the national default, and each one is off in a way that is easy to miss.
The passing score is 70 POINTS, scaled — not 70 percent, and it was 80 before July 2018. The term is three years, not two, so “24 hours per biennium” overstates the annual burden by fifty percent. The 20 prelicensing hours are real and adjuster-specific — and rest on a regulation the Division does not publish. Fingerprints are required of residents only.
The passing score is 70 POINTS, scaled — not 70 percent, and it was 80 before July 2018. The term is three years, not two, so “24 hours per biennium” overstates the annual burden by fifty percent. The 20 prelicensing hours are real and adjuster-specific — and rest on a regulation the Division does not publish. Fingerprints are required of residents only.
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The 20 hours are real — and no statute requires them
NAC 684A.220 sets the composition: “At least 5 hours of instruction… in the provisions of title 57 of NRS and the regulations adopted pursuant thereto, at least one-half of which must cover the laws and regulations common to all lines… and at least 15 hours of instruction in the classroom covering: (1) Principles and concepts of insurance in general; (2) Basic principles and concepts of the line…; (3) The processes related to adjusting a claim; (4) The ethical responsibilities of the adjuster; and (5) Regulation by the government.” NAC 684A.200 adds that the course must be completed “within 2 years immediately preceding the date of the application,” and by NAC 684A.116 it reaches all four license types.
⚠ NOW CHASE THE AUTHORITY. The regulations come from R028-18, whose authority string cites NRS 679B.130 (general rulemaking), NRS 684A.235 (“may promulgate reasonable regulations as are necessary or proper to carry out the purposes of this chapter” — also general) and NRS 684A.070. But § 684A.070 contains NO education requirement, and its only express rulemaking grant is subsection 3(c) — regulations on obtaining fingerprint and criminal-history information. And § 684A.100 requires an EXAMINATION, not a course.
⚠ CONCLUSION: no Nevada statute requires adjuster prelicensing education. The twenty hours rests on general rulemaking authority. The requirement is nonetheless on the books and it binds — what is wrong is only the claim that a statute imposes it.
⚠ AND THE DIVISION DOES NOT PUBLISH IT ANYWHERE. Checked individually and silent: the Independent, Public, Company, Staff and index adjuster pages; the Education Providers page; the Prelicensing Education Providers page. And Pearson’s handbook conditions prelicensing on “If required for your desired license type” without listing adjusters among the types requiring it. Only the Division’s Prelicensing Education Provider FAQs connects them.
⚠ NOW CHASE THE AUTHORITY. The regulations come from R028-18, whose authority string cites NRS 679B.130 (general rulemaking), NRS 684A.235 (“may promulgate reasonable regulations as are necessary or proper to carry out the purposes of this chapter” — also general) and NRS 684A.070. But § 684A.070 contains NO education requirement, and its only express rulemaking grant is subsection 3(c) — regulations on obtaining fingerprint and criminal-history information. And § 684A.100 requires an EXAMINATION, not a course.
⚠ CONCLUSION: no Nevada statute requires adjuster prelicensing education. The twenty hours rests on general rulemaking authority. The requirement is nonetheless on the books and it binds — what is wrong is only the claim that a statute imposes it.
⚠ AND THE DIVISION DOES NOT PUBLISH IT ANYWHERE. Checked individually and silent: the Independent, Public, Company, Staff and index adjuster pages; the Education Providers page; the Prelicensing Education Providers page. And Pearson’s handbook conditions prelicensing on “If required for your desired license type” without listing adjusters among the types requiring it. Only the Division’s Prelicensing Education Provider FAQs connects them.
| Exam | Name | Time | Taken by |
|---|---|---|---|
| 15 | NV Property and Casualty Adjuster | 2 hours | Independent · Company · Public |
| 16 | NV Workers Compensation Adjuster | 1 hour | Independent · Company · Staff |
“70 or more POINTS” — and it used to be 80NAC 684A.300: an applicant “must attain a score of 70 or more points in order to pass.” ⚠ Points, not percent. Pearson’s handbook describes Nevada as using “a scaled cut of 70” for all examinations except bail — two differently sourced instruments landing on the same number, and neither of them says “percent.” ⚠ R028-18 moved the score from 80 to 70 effective 1 July 2018 — any material citing 80 predates that. ⚠ Do not cite NAC 684A.010, which now prints as “[Replaced in revision by NAC 684A.300.]” ⚠ And scored question counts are NOT PUBLISHED — Pearson gives times and the fee but no counts, and no Nevada content outline supplies them. The examination fee is $3·7, a vendor price; Nevada’s fee statutes contain no adjuster examination line at all.
Fingerprints — residents only, and the pattern repeats three times§ 684A.070(2): “A natural person who is a resident of this State applying for a license must, as part of his or her application and at the applicant’s own expense…” arrange fingerprints and submit them for FBI processing. ⚠ Read the trigger — the duty attaches to a RESIDENT natural person. Nonresidents are licensed under § 684A.115, which conditions the license on home-state good standing, fees and reciprocity and imposes no fingerprint requirement; § 684A.080 imposes none on entities. A three-way split, not a yes-or-no. ⚠ And notice the pattern: Nevada splits resident from nonresident in THREE places and all three run the same way — fingerprints (§ 684A.070(2)), the examination (§ 684A.100 exempts a nonresident with a home-state license in good standing) and CE (§ 684A.135(2)). If a question turns on what a nonresident must do in Nevada, the answer is usually “whatever the home state required.”
| Fee or charge | Amount | Traces to |
|---|---|---|
| Application and license | $1·2·5 | § 680B.010(8)(a) |
| Add-on, initial and triennial | $6·0 | § 680C.110 — extended to company and staff adjusters by § 684A.050(2) |
| Published total, initial and renewal | $1·8·5 | arithmetic |
| Late renewal within the grace window | +$6·2.5·0 | § 684A.130(2)(a) — 150% of the $1·2·5 line only → $2·4·7.5·0 total |
| Temporary emergency (catastrophe) license | $1·8·5 | § 684A.060(7) |
| “DRL Association” fee | $5·0 | ⚠ DOES NOT TRACE — Division page only |
| “License Modification” fee | $5·0 | ⚠ DOES NOT TRACE — Division page only |
| Examination | $3·7 | ⚠ Vendor price, not a statutory fee |
| Temporary license — § 684A.150 | none | ⚠ NO FEE PRESCRIBED — a genuine statutory gap |
The cleanest fee-to-authority trace in the chapter§ 680B.010(8) is the entire adjuster fee statute and it has two lines: application and license $1·2·5, triennial renewal $1·2·5. § 680C.110 adds $6·0 initial and $6·0 triennial — but names only independent and public adjusters. ⚠ So how do company and staff adjusters pay anything? § 684A.050(2): “A company adjuster and a staff adjuster shall pay the same fees as provided for an independent adjuster in NRS 680B.010 and 680C.110.” § 684A.050 is not only the concurrency bar — its second subsection is the bridge that brings two of the four license types inside the fee statute at all. Without it they fall through entirely. Fees are non-refundable, and § 684A.110(2) and § 680C.110 each say so.
📅 Renewal — § 684A.130
🎓 Continuing education — § 684A.135
Three years. “Each license issued or renewed under this chapter continues in force for 3 years…”
24 hours per THREE-YEAR TERM, 3 of them ethics. NAC 684A.400 ties them to “the 3-year period before the date of renewal” and requires them to be related to the line or lines held.
⚠ The renewal date is a ROLLING MONTH-END. Subsection 7: “the last day of the month which is 3 years after the month in which the Commissioner originally issued the license.” Not a fixed statewide date and not a birthday — two adjusters licensed the same year can be eleven months apart.
⚠ “24 hours per biennium” IS WRONG, and it is wrong the hardest way to catch. The hour count is right and the period is wrong, so it overstates the annual burden by fifty percent. The real rate is 8 hours a year, not 12.
30-day grace window at 150% of the $1·2·5 line only — and ⚠ subsection (2)(c) requires proof of passing an examination unless exempt under § 684A.105. That is the working purpose of § 684A.105 — it is the LAPSE provision.
⚠ The nonresident exemption is CONJUNCTIVE — § 684A.135(2) requires both a nonresident license and that the licensee “has met the continuing education requirements of his or her home state.”
⚠ TWO VERSIONS PRINT. §§ 684A.090 and 684A.130 each appear as “[Effective until the date of the repeal of 42 U.S.C. § 666…]” and one after; the later drops the child-support statement. The repeal has not happened — cite the first.
No sliding scale. No first-term reduction. NO CARRY-OVER (NAC 684A.430). Teaching credit once per course per period; 1 credit hour = 50 minutes; records kept 4 years by sponsors and licensees alike.
A false CE affidavit is not merely a paperwork problemNAC 684A.450 makes a false or fraudulent affidavit of compliance a violation of the regulations, a material misrepresentation, AND proof of untrustworthiness under NRS 683A.451 — which is a ground for refusing, suspending or revoking a license. And NAC 684A.435 makes failure to produce a certificate on request evidence that the course was not completed, so the recordkeeping duty carries its own presumption.
Nevada’s claims law runs on TWO LEVELS, and the levels have different rules. Getting the instrument right gets the rule right.
The statute — § 686A.310 — enumerates sixteen unfair practices, has NO frequency element, and creates a private right of action for the insured only. The regulations — NAC 686A.600 to .690 — carry all the numeric deadlines, and it is there, in the scope provision, that the general-business-practice qualifier lives.
The statute — § 686A.310 — enumerates sixteen unfair practices, has NO frequency element, and creates a private right of action for the insured only. The regulations — NAC 686A.600 to .690 — carry all the numeric deadlines, and it is there, in the scope provision, that the general-business-practice qualifier lives.
📜 THE STATUTE — NRS 686A.310
📋 THE REGULATION — NAC 686A.600–.690
Chapeau, in its entirety: “Engaging in any of the following activities is considered to be an unfair practice:”
NAC 686A.600(1): “NAC 686A.600 to 686A.680, inclusive, define certain minimum standards, violations of which, with a frequency which indicates a general business practice, will be deemed to constitute unfair claims settlement practices.”
⚠ NO general business practice element. A SINGLE ACT IS A VIOLATION.
⚠ The frequency element governs the REGULATIONS ONLY — and only .600 to .680. It cannot narrow the statute.
Creates a private right — subsection 2, “liable to its insured.”
Carries every numeric deadline. Subsection (3): “Acts not specified… may also be deemed to be violations of NRS 686A.310” — a floor, not a ceiling.
Not amended since 1991 — (Added to NRS by 1·9·7·5, 1·2·8·5; A 1·9·8·7, 1·0·6·7; 1·9·9·1, 2·2·0·2)
⚠ Subsection (2) has a DIFFERENT range — .600 to .690 — and excludes SURETY insurance. The .680/.690 mismatch is in the regulation itself, not a transcription error.
The correct statement of Nevada law — name the instrumentA single violation of the STATUTE is actionable. But to convert a breach of the REGULATORY minimum standards into a deemed unfair claims settlement practice, the Division needs frequency indicating a general business practice. ⚠ Two different tests, one level apart. A candidate who answers “Nevada has no general business practice element” is half right. A candidate who answers “Nevada requires a general business practice” is half right. The full answer names the instrument.
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Sixteen practices, (a) through (p) — and the last five are the ones to memorize
Paragraphs (a)–(k) are the familiar NAIC list — misrepresenting policy provisions, failing to acknowledge promptly, failing to adopt reasonable investigation standards, failing to affirm or deny after proofs of loss, failing to effectuate prompt fair and equitable settlements “in which liability of the insurer has become reasonably clear,” compelling insureds to litigate, and so on.
The tail is where Nevada goes further than most states:
(l) failing to settle promptly under one portion of coverage “in order to influence settlements under other portions”
(m) failing to comply with NRS 687B.310 to 687B.390 or 687B.410
(n) failing to provide promptly “a reasonable explanation of the basis in the insurance policy… for the denial of the claim or for an offer to settle”
(o) “Advising an insured or claimant not to seek legal counsel.”
(p) “Misleading an insured or claimant concerning any applicable statute of limitations.”
⚠ THERE IS NO (q). The list ends at sixteen.
⚠ (o) AND (p) ARE SQUARELY ADJUSTER CONDUCT, AND VERY FEW STATES ENUMERATE THEM. Neither requires a pattern. Neither requires bad faith. Both describe things an adjuster does personally rather than things a company does institutionally — and § 684A.035 applies this entire section to adjusters by name. They are the two paragraphs most likely to reach an individual.
⚠ Note the drafting asymmetry, which is deliberate: (a), (j), (k), (o) and (p) say “insureds or claimants”; (n) says only “an insured”; (g) says “a claim by an insured.”
The tail is where Nevada goes further than most states:
(l) failing to settle promptly under one portion of coverage “in order to influence settlements under other portions”
(m) failing to comply with NRS 687B.310 to 687B.390 or 687B.410
(n) failing to provide promptly “a reasonable explanation of the basis in the insurance policy… for the denial of the claim or for an offer to settle”
(o) “Advising an insured or claimant not to seek legal counsel.”
(p) “Misleading an insured or claimant concerning any applicable statute of limitations.”
⚠ THERE IS NO (q). The list ends at sixteen.
⚠ (o) AND (p) ARE SQUARELY ADJUSTER CONDUCT, AND VERY FEW STATES ENUMERATE THEM. Neither requires a pattern. Neither requires bad faith. Both describe things an adjuster does personally rather than things a company does institutionally — and § 684A.035 applies this entire section to adjusters by name. They are the two paragraphs most likely to reach an individual.
⚠ Note the drafting asymmetry, which is deliberate: (a), (j), (k), (o) and (p) say “insureds or claimants”; (n) says only “an insured”; (g) says “a claim by an insured.”
| Duty | Time | Cite & unit |
|---|---|---|
| Acknowledge a claim, unless payment is made within that time | 20 | NAC 686A.665(1) — working |
| Respond to a Division inquiry about a claim | 10 | NAC 686A.665(2) — working (+20 on request) |
| Reply to any other pertinent communication from a claimant | 20 | NAC 686A.665(3) — working |
| Provide claim forms and instructions — ⚠ SAFE HARBOR: satisfies subsection (1) | 20 | NAC 686A.665(4) — working |
| BEGIN an investigation, and mail notice of items required | 20 | NAC 686A.670(1) — working |
| COMPLETE the investigation, unless not reasonably possible | 30 | NAC 686A.670(2) — ⚠ CALENDAR |
| Advise a first-party claimant of acceptance or denial, after properly executed proofs of loss | 30 | NAC 686A.675(1) — working |
| PAY after acceptance — interest under NRS 99.040 if late | 30 | NAC 686A.675(1) — ⚠ CALENDAR |
| Notify more time is needed, with reasons — then update every 30 days | 30 | NAC 686A.675(3) — working |
| Written notice before the statute of limitations expires | 60 | NAC 686A.675(5) — calendar |
| Respond to a Division inquiry about anything other than a claim | 20 | NAC 686A.690 — working |
working dayscalendar days
⚠ Nevada changes UNITS inside single sections — do not smooth this overNAC 686A.670: subsection (1) is 20 WORKING days; subsection (2) is 30 days with no modifier — and both run from the SAME trigger, receipt of notice of the claim. In a holiday-heavy stretch the 30 calendar days can expire BEFORE the 20 working days. NAC 686A.675(1) does it again INSIDE ONE SUBSECTION: the decision period is 30 WORKING days; the payment period is 30 CALENDAR days — different units, different triggers (proofs of loss for one, acceptance for the other). ⚠ And mind the 10-versus-20 split on Division inquiries: about a CLAIM it is 10 working days; about ANYTHING ELSE it is 20. The shorter period attaches to the more serious subject, which is the opposite of most people’s intuition.
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The third-party gap — protected by the regulation, remedy-less under the statute
NAC 686A.620 defines “claimant” as one who “includes a first-party claimant, a third-party claimant, or both, and designated legal representatives and members of the claimant’s immediate family designated by the claimant.”
So the deadlines that use “claimant” REACH third parties — NAC 686A.665 (acknowledgment; replies) and NAC 686A.670 (investigation). But NAC 686A.675(1), the accept-or-deny clock, uses “FIRST-PARTY claimant” — that protection stops at the insured.
And the damages remedy runs only to the insured. § 686A.310(2) makes an insurer “liable to its insured.” Gunny v. Allstate, Docket No. 22318, Nev. Sup. Ct., 13 May 1992: “Greg has no private right of action as a third-party claimant under NRS 686A.310.”
⚠ AND THE LEGISLATURE CONFIRMED IT EXPRESSLY IN 2005. § 686A.325 requires notice when an insurer pays $5,0·0·0 or more to a claimant’s representative — and subsection 2 says failure to give it “does not: (a) Create… a cause of action for any natural person or entity other than the Commissioner. (b) Establish… a defense for any party to any cause of action.” A rare, deliberately remedy-less mandate — and a double negative.
⚠ PUT IT TOGETHER AND TEACH IT AS ONE DESIGN DECISION. A Nevada third-party claimant is covered by the acknowledgment and investigation standards; is not covered by accept-or-deny; cannot sue under § 686A.310; cannot sue for common-law bad faith, because there is no privity; and is expressly denied an action under § 686A.325. Four rules, one decision.
So the deadlines that use “claimant” REACH third parties — NAC 686A.665 (acknowledgment; replies) and NAC 686A.670 (investigation). But NAC 686A.675(1), the accept-or-deny clock, uses “FIRST-PARTY claimant” — that protection stops at the insured.
And the damages remedy runs only to the insured. § 686A.310(2) makes an insurer “liable to its insured.” Gunny v. Allstate, Docket No. 22318, Nev. Sup. Ct., 13 May 1992: “Greg has no private right of action as a third-party claimant under NRS 686A.310.”
⚠ AND THE LEGISLATURE CONFIRMED IT EXPRESSLY IN 2005. § 686A.325 requires notice when an insurer pays $5,0·0·0 or more to a claimant’s representative — and subsection 2 says failure to give it “does not: (a) Create… a cause of action for any natural person or entity other than the Commissioner. (b) Establish… a defense for any party to any cause of action.” A rare, deliberately remedy-less mandate — and a double negative.
⚠ PUT IT TOGETHER AND TEACH IT AS ONE DESIGN DECISION. A Nevada third-party claimant is covered by the acknowledgment and investigation standards; is not covered by accept-or-deny; cannot sue under § 686A.310; cannot sue for common-law bad faith, because there is no privity; and is expressly denied an action under § 686A.325. Four rules, one decision.
The auto payment clock — and its trigger is narrow§ 686A.300(2): a delay is failure to issue a check or draft “within 30 days after the insurer’s receipt of the statement of charges for repairs which have been satisfactorily completed.” ⚠ EVERY CONDITION MUST BE MET: a statement of charges under NRS 487.6·8·9·3; from a shop previously authorized by the insured; for repairs satisfactorily completed; clock running from the insurer’s receipt. This is a SHOP-PAYMENT clock on completed work, not a generic auto-claim payment clock. “30 days” carries no modifier — CALENDAR days. ⚠ The $3·0·0 figure is NOT a payment threshold — it is an exception to a mandatory-repair rule that applies only where there is a security interest or a split legal/registered owner. ⚠ And § 686A.300 has no penalty, no interest and no private remedy — it is definitional. ⚠ NAC 686A.680 contains NO day-count deadline at all: its 90 days, 15 model years and 85 percent are VALUATION parameters.
Nevada gives an insured more routes than almost any state — and then gives a comp claimant none at all.
Punitive damages against a bad-faith insurer are UNCAPPED, the harder statutory definitions of malice and oppression do not apply to insurers either, and by express statute an individual adjuster can be sued personally. But on the workers’ compensation side the Legislature abolished the bad-faith action outright in 1995. Same conduct, same state, opposite answers — and the dividing line is which chapter the claim arises under.
Punitive damages against a bad-faith insurer are UNCAPPED, the harder statutory definitions of malice and oppression do not apply to insurers either, and by express statute an individual adjuster can be sued personally. But on the workers’ compensation side the Legislature abolished the bad-faith action outright in 1995. Same conduct, same state, opposite answers — and the dividing line is which chapter the claim arises under.
The bad-faith test is CONJUNCTIVE — the “or” belongs inside the second prongPowers v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, Docket No. 26794, Nev. Sup. Ct., 16 July 1998: “To establish a prima facie case of bad-faith refusal to pay an insurance claim, the plaintiff must establish that the insurer had no reasonable basis for disputing coverage, AND that the insurer knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that there was no reasonable basis for disputing coverage.” The Miller shorthand — “an actual or implied awareness of the absence of a reasonable basis” — is the same test compressed. ⚠ TWO PRONGS JOINED BY “AND.” The “or” belongs INSIDE prong two — knowledge or reckless disregard; actual or implied awareness. The “or” is NEVER between the prongs. A source writing “no reasonable basis OR knowledge of the absence of a reasonable basis” has stated Nevada law backwards and made the tort dramatically easier to prove.
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Two axes — and conflating them is the standard error
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Miller, Docket No. 49760, Nev. Sup. Ct., 30 July 2009, is a THIRD-PARTY failure-to-settle case. Allstate’s insured had a $2·5,0·0·0 limit; Allstate’s handling of the claimant’s demand produced a verdict against its own insured of $7·0·3,6·1·9.8·8 — and the insured sued Allstate.
“A bad-faith action applies to more than just an insurer’s denial or delay in paying a claim.”
“An insurer’s failure to adequately inform an insured of a settlement offer may also constitute grounds for a bad-faith claim.”
“An insurer must equally consider the insured’s interests and its own.”
But only a party in contractual PRIVITY may sue. United Fire Ins. Co. v. McClelland, Docket 18705, Nev. Sup. Ct., 6 Sept. 1989 reversed a non-contracting family member’s recovery because “a contractual basis did not exist between her and the insurer.”
⚠ AXIS ONE — WHO MAY SUE? Only someone in privity. A third-party claimant cannot sue the tortfeasor’s insurer for bad faith. ⚠ AXIS TWO — WHAT CONDUCT COUNTS? Not merely first-party denial — liability-claim mishandling counts too.
Get them separately and Miller, Gunny and McClelland all fit together. Conflate them and you will conclude either that Nevada has no third-party bad faith — wrong, it has third-party claim-handling bad faith brought by the insured — or that a claimant may sue the other driver’s carrier, which Gunny squarely forecloses.
“A bad-faith action applies to more than just an insurer’s denial or delay in paying a claim.”
“An insurer’s failure to adequately inform an insured of a settlement offer may also constitute grounds for a bad-faith claim.”
“An insurer must equally consider the insured’s interests and its own.”
But only a party in contractual PRIVITY may sue. United Fire Ins. Co. v. McClelland, Docket 18705, Nev. Sup. Ct., 6 Sept. 1989 reversed a non-contracting family member’s recovery because “a contractual basis did not exist between her and the insurer.”
⚠ AXIS ONE — WHO MAY SUE? Only someone in privity. A third-party claimant cannot sue the tortfeasor’s insurer for bad faith. ⚠ AXIS TWO — WHAT CONDUCT COUNTS? Not merely first-party denial — liability-claim mishandling counts too.
Get them separately and Miller, Gunny and McClelland all fit together. Conflate them and you will conclude either that Nevada has no third-party bad faith — wrong, it has third-party claim-handling bad faith brought by the insured — or that a claimant may sue the other driver’s carrier, which Gunny squarely forecloses.
| Punitive damages — § 42.005 | Rule |
|---|---|
| Compensatory award $1·0·0,0·0·0 or more | 3× compensatory |
| Compensatory award less than $1·0·0,0·0·0 | $3·0·0,0·0·0 |
| Action against an insurer acting in bad faith re coverage obligations | ⚠ NO CAP — § 42.005(2)(b) |
| Statutory definitions in § 42.001 (“despicable” conduct, “willful and deliberate”) | ⚠ DO NOT APPLY — common law governs — § 42.005(5) |
| Burden of proof | Clear and convincing (added 1995) |
| Bifurcation | MANDATORY, same trier of fact, special verdict |
| The jury and the caps | “must not be instructed, or otherwise advised” |
| Financial-condition evidence | Inadmissible until phase two |
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Two inversions — and almost nobody charts the second
INVERSION ONE — § 42.005(2)(b): the caps “do not apply to an action brought against… an insurer who acts in bad faith regarding its obligations to provide insurance coverage.” Punitive damages against a bad-faith insurer in Nevada are UNCAPPED as a matter of state statute. ⚠ But read the clause — it is narrower than “insurers are exempt.” The bad faith must concern coverage obligations; an insurer sued over marketing, agent misconduct or a premium dispute stays capped.
INVERSION TWO — § 42.005(5), and this is the one that gets omitted: “For the purposes of an action brought against an insurer who acts in bad faith regarding its obligations to provide insurance coverage, the definitions set forth in NRS 42.001 are not applicable and the corresponding provisions of the common law apply.”
§ 42.001’s definitions are markedly HARDER than the common law. “Malice” requires conduct intended to injure or “despicable conduct” with conscious disregard. “Oppression” requires “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship.” “Conscious disregard” requires “a willful and deliberate failure to act.” A bad-faith insurer defendant gets the benefit of none of them. § 42.001’s own preamble confirms it, carving out “except as otherwise provided in subsection 5 of NRS 42.005.”
⚠ NO CAP, AND NO DEFINITIONAL PROTECTION. Both come from the same statute, both cut the same way, and they must be taught together.
INVERSION TWO — § 42.005(5), and this is the one that gets omitted: “For the purposes of an action brought against an insurer who acts in bad faith regarding its obligations to provide insurance coverage, the definitions set forth in NRS 42.001 are not applicable and the corresponding provisions of the common law apply.”
§ 42.001’s definitions are markedly HARDER than the common law. “Malice” requires conduct intended to injure or “despicable conduct” with conscious disregard. “Oppression” requires “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship.” “Conscious disregard” requires “a willful and deliberate failure to act.” A bad-faith insurer defendant gets the benefit of none of them. § 42.001’s own preamble confirms it, carving out “except as otherwise provided in subsection 5 of NRS 42.005.”
⚠ NO CAP, AND NO DEFINITIONAL PROTECTION. Both come from the same statute, both cut the same way, and they must be taught together.
⚠ “Uncapped” is not “unreviewable” — and mind the pre-1995 burden trapIn Guaranty National Insurance Co. v. Potter, Docket 26373, Nev. Sup. Ct., 1996, the court reduced a $1,0·0·0,0·0·0 punitive award to $2·5·0,0·0·0 as “excessive as a matter of law” despite finding sufficient evidence of oppression — weighing that the insurer paid policy limits promptly, prepaid initial examinations and repeatedly attempted settlement. Common-law excessiveness review and federal due-process review both survive the exemption. ⚠ SEPARATELY: the clear-and-convincing standard was inserted by a 1995 amendment. McClelland (1989) and American Excess v. MGM Grand (1986) both predate it, so any compendium quoting a burden from those opinions quotes a superseded standard. Note the pairing that must be stated together: the BURDEN is statutory and applies to insurers; the DEFINITIONS are common-law and do not. ⚠ And § 42.021 has NOTHING to do with insurance — it is a medical-malpractice collateral-source provision from a 2004 ballot initiative.
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You can be sued personally — by express statute
§ 684A.035: “1. The provisions of NRS 683A.341 and 686A.310 apply to adjusters. 2. For the purposes of subsection 1, unless the context requires that a section apply only to producers of insurance or insurers, any reference in those sections to ‘producer of insurance’ or ‘insurer’ must be replaced by a reference to ‘adjuster.’”
Apply the substitution to § 686A.310(2) and it reads: “…an adjuster is liable to its insured for any damages sustained by the insured as a result of the commission of any act set forth in subsection 1 as an unfair practice.”
⚠ AN INDIVIDUAL ADJUSTER CAN BE SUED PERSONALLY IN NEVADA, AND THE ENTIRE (a)–(p) LIST BINDS ADJUSTERS DIRECTLY. Most states reach adjusters only through the insurer, if at all. Read it alongside (o) and (p) — advising a claimant not to seek counsel, and misleading anyone about a limitations period — and the exposure becomes concrete.
Note the limits, because two published summaries get them wrong. The statute does not deem an adjuster an insurer; it applies two specific sections and rewrites the noun. It imports only § 683A.341 and § 686A.310 — not the rest of chapter 686A. And it says “adjusters” without distinguishing among the four types.
⚠ THERE IS A WEAK JOINT, AND IT IS HONEST TO NAME IT. After the substitution the section reads that an adjuster is liable “to its insured.” An adjuster has no insured of its own. Whether a court reads that as “the insurer’s insured” — the sensible construction, and the one the “unless the context requires” clause seems to invite — or as a defect defeating the claim is unresolved, because no reported decision applies § 684A.035 at all.
Common-law bad faith against an adjuster is a different question, and the likely answer is NO — the tort requires privity and an adjuster has none. So the probable position is: no common-law tort against an adjuster, but YES a statutory claim. An inference from two instruments, not a holding.
Apply the substitution to § 686A.310(2) and it reads: “…an adjuster is liable to its insured for any damages sustained by the insured as a result of the commission of any act set forth in subsection 1 as an unfair practice.”
⚠ AN INDIVIDUAL ADJUSTER CAN BE SUED PERSONALLY IN NEVADA, AND THE ENTIRE (a)–(p) LIST BINDS ADJUSTERS DIRECTLY. Most states reach adjusters only through the insurer, if at all. Read it alongside (o) and (p) — advising a claimant not to seek counsel, and misleading anyone about a limitations period — and the exposure becomes concrete.
Note the limits, because two published summaries get them wrong. The statute does not deem an adjuster an insurer; it applies two specific sections and rewrites the noun. It imports only § 683A.341 and § 686A.310 — not the rest of chapter 686A. And it says “adjusters” without distinguishing among the four types.
⚠ THERE IS A WEAK JOINT, AND IT IS HONEST TO NAME IT. After the substitution the section reads that an adjuster is liable “to its insured.” An adjuster has no insured of its own. Whether a court reads that as “the insurer’s insured” — the sensible construction, and the one the “unless the context requires” clause seems to invite — or as a defect defeating the claim is unresolved, because no reported decision applies § 684A.035 at all.
Common-law bad faith against an adjuster is a different question, and the likely answer is NO — the tort requires privity and an adjuster has none. So the probable position is: no common-law tort against an adjuster, but YES a statutory claim. An inference from two instruments, not a holding.
The statutory claim and the tort ARE cumulative — two compendia say the oppositeHart v. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co., 848 F. Supp. 900 (D. Nev. 1994): “The Nevada Unfair Practices Act focuses upon different conduct than does the common law tort of bad faith” … “not every violation … is a per se act of bad faith.” ⚠ TWO NATIONAL COMPENDIA RENDER THIS AS “NOT CUMULATIVE.” THAT IS A MISREADING. Hart says the statute and the tort reach different conduct — which is precisely why both may be pleaded together. “Different conduct” is not “mutually exclusive.” ⚠ And note the authority level: Hart is a federal district court, not the Nevada Supreme Court, and no Nevada Supreme Court holding on cumulation was located. State the proposition with that qualification.
Four auto and property rules where Nevada does the opposite of what a national course teaches.
UM is mandatory; UIM need only be OFFERED — with opposite written-consent defaults. The UIM measure is DAMAGES-based, not difference-in-limits. Comparative fault is measured against the COMBINED fault of all defendants. And the famous 65% is a TITLING definition that does not govern claim settlement at all.
UM is mandatory; UIM need only be OFFERED — with opposite written-consent defaults. The UIM measure is DAMAGES-based, not difference-in-limits. Comparative fault is measured against the COMBINED fault of all defendants. And the famous 65% is a TITLING definition that does not govern claim settlement at all.
🚗 UM — § 690B.020
🚘 UIM — § 687B.145(2)
MANDATORY — “no policy… may be delivered or issued for delivery in this State unless coverage is provided”
MUST BE OFFERED ONLY — “must offer, on a form approved by the Commissioner”
⚠ REJECTED IN WRITING, on a form furnished by the insurer describing the coverage being rejected
⚠ PURCHASED BY WRITTEN REQUEST — “The insured may purchase the coverage by requesting it in writing”
Not less than ch. 485 minimums, but may not exceed the insured’s own BI limits — a floor AND a ceiling
Offered equal to the insured’s BI limits. ⚠ “Each renewal must include a copy of the form offering such coverage.”
Covers hit-and-run expressly; presumes a vehicle uninsured if no evidence of financial responsibility is filed within 60 days of a crash
Excluded from the offer duty: commercial liability, excess and umbrella — § 687B.145(5). § 687B.440 requires a signed umbrella disclosure
⚠ THE DEFAULTS ARE OPPOSITE AND THEY ARE CONSTANTLY CONFLATED. UM exists unless rejected in writing. UIM does not exist unless requested in writing.
⚠ AND THE UIM RE-OFFER DUTY AT EVERY RENEWAL IS EXAM-CRITICAL AND FREQUENTLY MISSED.
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The UIM measure is DAMAGES-based — not difference-in-limits
§ 687B.145(2) defines coverage that “enables the insured… to recover up to the limits of the insured’s own coverage any amount of damages for bodily injury… which the insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of the other vehicle to the extent that those damages exceed the limits of the coverage for bodily injury carried by that owner or operator.”
⚠ PARSE IT. The quantity that must exceed the tortfeasor’s limits is the insured’s DAMAGES — not the insured’s own limits. The insured’s limits function only as the CAP.
Why it decides claims: under true difference-in-limits, a claimant with 25/50 UIM facing a 25/50 tortfeasor recovers NOTHING, however badly injured — the limits are equal. Under the Nevada text, the question is whether DAMAGES exceed the tortfeasor’s $2·5,0·0·0 — and if they do, UIM responds up to the insured’s own limit. Do not publish, and do not answer, “difference in limits” for Nevada.
⚠ PARSE IT. The quantity that must exceed the tortfeasor’s limits is the insured’s DAMAGES — not the insured’s own limits. The insured’s limits function only as the CAP.
Why it decides claims: under true difference-in-limits, a claimant with 25/50 UIM facing a 25/50 tortfeasor recovers NOTHING, however badly injured — the limits are equal. Under the Nevada text, the question is whether DAMAGES exceed the tortfeasor’s $2·5,0·0·0 — and if they do, UIM responds up to the insured’s own limit. Do not publish, and do not answer, “difference in limits” for Nevada.
Stacking — the emphasis is what gets inverted⚠ The word “stack” does not appear in § 687B.145. What subsection (1) does is PERMIT a limiting provision where two or more coverages apply: recovery “may equal but not exceed the higher of the applicable limits,” prorated — and such provisions “must be in clear language and be prominently displayed in the policy, binder or endorsement.” Correct statement: Nevada AUTHORIZES anti-stacking clauses and conditions their validity on clear language and prominent display. Absent a compliant provision, the higher-limits-and-proration default governs. Saying flatly “stacking is permitted” inverts the emphasis — the statute is a limitation-authorizing provision with a drafting standard attached, and the conspicuousness requirement is the litigated part. Related: § 687B.147 permits a household BI exclusion only on a Commissioner-approved form in at least 12-point type, with the excluded family members’ names handwritten by the insured, a full signature, and re-disclosure at renewal.
Comparative negligence — against the COMBINED fault of all defendants§ 41.141(2)(a): “The plaintiff may not recover if the plaintiff’s comparative negligence… is greater than the negligence of the defendant or the combined negligence of multiple defendants.” ⚠ A plaintiff 40% at fault against two defendants at 30% each RECOVERS, because 40 is not greater than 60. In a state comparing the plaintiff to each defendant individually, that same plaintiff recovers nothing — one word reverses the outcome. ⚠ AND IT IS “GREATER THAN,” NOT “EQUAL TO OR GREATER THAN” — a 50/50 split is a RECOVERY. ⚠ The statute reaches “injury to property” as well as persons, so it governs the physical damage side too. And the comparison is to “the parties to the action against whom recovery is sought” — so the fault of settled, immune or unnamed tortfeasors is on its face outside it. Several liability is the default (subsection 4), with joint and several preserved for strict liability, intentional torts, toxic spillage, concerted acts and product claims (subsection 5).
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The 65% is a TITLING definition — and the “80%” is a bill that died
§ 487.790 defines a total loss vehicle as one damaged such that the cost of repair equals 65 percent or more of fair market value immediately before the damage. ⚠ THREE ITEMS ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE REPAIR-COST CALCULATION, AND THEY MOVE THE ARITHMETIC: painting any portion of the vehicle; replacing electronic components in accordance with the specifications of the manufacturer; and towing. ⚠ And “electronic components” is itself a defined term — § 487.725 enumerates computer control modules for the engine, air-conditioning, traction control, antilock braking, hybrid propulsion, wiring harnesses and supplemental restraint systems. The exclusion is wider than “the radio.”
Note the definition also has a REGISTRATION element — the vehicle must be “of a type which is subject to registration.”
Four carve-outs: a nonrepairable vehicle; a vehicle 10 model years old or older which, to restore it and ⚠ “regardless of cost,” requires replacement of only the hood, the trunk lid, a fender, two or fewer of {doors, a grill assembly, a bumper assembly, a headlight assembly, a taillight assembly}, or any combination; repair cost below 65% “regardless of the age of the vehicle”; and a stolen-and-recovered vehicle that has no structural damage and is “missing only tires, wheels, audio or video equipment, or some combination thereof.”
⚠ AND SUBSECTION 3 SUPPLIES THE TRIGGER FOR THE AGE TEST, WHICH ALMOST NOBODY QUOTES: “For the purposes of this section, the model year of manufacture is calculated based on a year beginning on January 1 of the calendar year in which the damage occurs.” Measured from 1 January of the year of loss — not the loss date, and not the settlement date.
⚠ NOW THE POINT. § 487.790 SITS IN THE DMV’S CHAPTER ON REPAIR, REMOVAL AND DISPOSAL OF VEHICLES. IT IS A TITLING AND BRANDING DEFINITION. § 487.770 defines “salvage vehicle” and contains no percentage of its own — it inherits .790’s. § 487.800 is TRANSACTIONAL: the insurer’s duty attaches when it “acquires a motor vehicle as a result of a settlement in which the motor vehicle is determined to be a salvage vehicle,” then 180 days to forward the endorsed title, with an “as soon as practicable” fallback if the owner does not supply title within 30 days.
⚠ NOTHING IN CHAPTER 487 OBLIGES AN INSURER TO DECLARE A TOTAL LOSS AT 65%, AND NOTHING FORBIDS TOTALING BELOW IT. The claim-settlement rule is NAC 686A.680, and it contains no percentage at all — it requires either a replacement vehicle with transfer costs covered or a cash settlement on comparables “within the most previous 90 days,” from a database covering “at least 85 percent of all makes and models” within “the most recent 15 model years,” with deductions “measurable, discernible, itemized and specified as to the amount” and the vehicle “restored to its condition before the loss at no additional cost to the claimant.”
⚠ AND AN 80% NEVADA THRESHOLD IS LOOSE IN THE WILD. Assembly Bill 368 (2017) would have raised it from 65 to 80 and cut the exemptions — IT DIED IN COMMITTEE. The section’s source note ends at 2011. Check that a number comes from an ENACTED act, not merely a well-covered one.
Note the definition also has a REGISTRATION element — the vehicle must be “of a type which is subject to registration.”
Four carve-outs: a nonrepairable vehicle; a vehicle 10 model years old or older which, to restore it and ⚠ “regardless of cost,” requires replacement of only the hood, the trunk lid, a fender, two or fewer of {doors, a grill assembly, a bumper assembly, a headlight assembly, a taillight assembly}, or any combination; repair cost below 65% “regardless of the age of the vehicle”; and a stolen-and-recovered vehicle that has no structural damage and is “missing only tires, wheels, audio or video equipment, or some combination thereof.”
⚠ AND SUBSECTION 3 SUPPLIES THE TRIGGER FOR THE AGE TEST, WHICH ALMOST NOBODY QUOTES: “For the purposes of this section, the model year of manufacture is calculated based on a year beginning on January 1 of the calendar year in which the damage occurs.” Measured from 1 January of the year of loss — not the loss date, and not the settlement date.
⚠ NOW THE POINT. § 487.790 SITS IN THE DMV’S CHAPTER ON REPAIR, REMOVAL AND DISPOSAL OF VEHICLES. IT IS A TITLING AND BRANDING DEFINITION. § 487.770 defines “salvage vehicle” and contains no percentage of its own — it inherits .790’s. § 487.800 is TRANSACTIONAL: the insurer’s duty attaches when it “acquires a motor vehicle as a result of a settlement in which the motor vehicle is determined to be a salvage vehicle,” then 180 days to forward the endorsed title, with an “as soon as practicable” fallback if the owner does not supply title within 30 days.
⚠ NOTHING IN CHAPTER 487 OBLIGES AN INSURER TO DECLARE A TOTAL LOSS AT 65%, AND NOTHING FORBIDS TOTALING BELOW IT. The claim-settlement rule is NAC 686A.680, and it contains no percentage at all — it requires either a replacement vehicle with transfer costs covered or a cash settlement on comparables “within the most previous 90 days,” from a database covering “at least 85 percent of all makes and models” within “the most recent 15 model years,” with deductions “measurable, discernible, itemized and specified as to the amount” and the vehicle “restored to its condition before the loss at no additional cost to the claimant.”
⚠ AND AN 80% NEVADA THRESHOLD IS LOOSE IN THE WILD. Assembly Bill 368 (2017) would have raised it from 65 to 80 and cut the exemptions — IT DIED IN COMMITTEE. The section’s source note ends at 2011. Check that a number comes from an ENACTED act, not merely a well-covered one.
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Wildfire may now be excluded — and read what the section does NOT do
§ 691A.035, added by AB 376 (2025), effective 1 January 2026:
(1) “An insurer that issues a policy of property insurance may exclude the peril of wildfire from the coverage provided under the policy.”
(2) an insurer may issue a policy that solely covers wildfire.
(3) the policy may use a varying definition of wildfire if the Commissioner has approved the variance.
(4) “wildfire” means “an unplanned and uncontrolled fire in an area of combustible vegetation that originated from outside any residential or commercial property.”
⚠ WHAT IT DOES NOT DO IS THE TESTED PART. There is no requirement to offer standalone wildfire coverage — subsection 2 is permissive. There is no notice or disclosure duty about the exclusion. And there is no Commissioner approval requirement for the exclusion itself — approval is needed only to vary the definition.
⚠ THE EFFECTIVE DATE IS PHASED, AND THE SUNSET DOES NOT REACH IT. AB 376 § 27 makes one section effective on passage, some on 1 July 2025, and most — including wildfire — on 1 January 2026. Separately §§ 2 to 20 expire on 1 January 2030, but the wildfire section is not in that band. A sweep that stopped at “passed in 2025” gets the date wrong; one that read only the current NRS text misses the sunset architecture.
⚠ AND NOTE THE DEFINITION’S BOUNDARY: a fire ORIGINATING INSIDE a residential or commercial property is not a “wildfire,” however far it spreads. On a wildland-urban-interface loss, where the fire started may decide whether the exclusion applies at all.
(1) “An insurer that issues a policy of property insurance may exclude the peril of wildfire from the coverage provided under the policy.”
(2) an insurer may issue a policy that solely covers wildfire.
(3) the policy may use a varying definition of wildfire if the Commissioner has approved the variance.
(4) “wildfire” means “an unplanned and uncontrolled fire in an area of combustible vegetation that originated from outside any residential or commercial property.”
⚠ WHAT IT DOES NOT DO IS THE TESTED PART. There is no requirement to offer standalone wildfire coverage — subsection 2 is permissive. There is no notice or disclosure duty about the exclusion. And there is no Commissioner approval requirement for the exclusion itself — approval is needed only to vary the definition.
⚠ THE EFFECTIVE DATE IS PHASED, AND THE SUNSET DOES NOT REACH IT. AB 376 § 27 makes one section effective on passage, some on 1 July 2025, and most — including wildfire — on 1 January 2026. Separately §§ 2 to 20 expire on 1 January 2030, but the wildfire section is not in that band. A sweep that stopped at “passed in 2025” gets the date wrong; one that read only the current NRS text misses the sunset architecture.
⚠ AND NOTE THE DEFINITION’S BOUNDARY: a fire ORIGINATING INSIDE a residential or commercial property is not a “wildfire,” however far it spreads. On a wildland-urban-interface loss, where the fire started may decide whether the exclusion applies at all.
What Nevada does NOT have — all proved by enumerating the chaptersNo prescribed standard fire policy. No valued policy law. No matching rule. No ordinance-or-law mandate. No statutory ACV definition. No depreciation-of-labor rule. No catastrophe deductible regulation. No appraisal statute. Chapters read in full: NRS 691A (all five sections), NRS 687B (.010 through .450), NAC 686A, NAC 687B, NAC 690B. ⚠ Appraisal is CONTRACTUAL ONLY, and no Nevada authority says whether a panel may decide causation — so this course states no Nevada rule on appraisal scope. ⚠ And one adjacent statute may matter a great deal: § 690B.017 provides that “no provision for arbitration contained in an automobile liability or motor vehicle liability insurance policy… is binding upon the named insured or any other person who makes a claim.” Whether that reaches a first-party APPRAISAL clause is an open question — appraisal and arbitration are doctrinally distinct but functionally adjacent. No authority either way; flagged, not answered. Do not cite NRS ch. 684B — that is a licensing chapter for motor vehicle damage appraisers, not a rule about appraisal clauses.
Limitation periods — six years, and no statute voids the policy clause§ 11.190 gives 6 years on “a contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing” — the policy; 4 years not founded on a writing; 3 years for injury to personal property; 2 years for personal injury or death. ⚠ Nevada has NO statute voiding contractual changes to a limitation period — ch. 11 searched for “agreement,” “contract,” “shorten,” “waive”; ch. 687B enumerated .010 through .450 with no section on suit-limitation clauses. So the 12-month clause is NOT statutorily void here. ⚠ But do not answer “enforceable, full stop” — that is a case-law question this course does not verify. And two instruments govern how an insurer may USE the period: NAC 686A.675(5) requires 60 days’ written notice before a limitation expires if negotiations are being delayed, and § 686A.310(1)(p) makes misleading anyone about a limitations period an enumerated unfair practice. Three instruments, one subject.
Ten fact patterns drawn from the places Nevada swaps a familiar word, splits a familiar rule, or gives the opposite answer to the same question.
Each one is a claim you could be handed on a Monday morning. Read the fact pattern before the options, and ask which instrument you are in before you ask what the rule says. Several questions carry a plausible wrong answer that is simply the rule of a different state, and one carries a number that comes from a bill that never passed.
Each one is a claim you could be handed on a Monday morning. Read the fact pattern before the options, and ask which instrument you are in before you ask what the rule says. Several questions carry a plausible wrong answer that is simply the rule of a different state, and one carries a number that comes from a bill that never passed.
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Top Exam Tips — Nevada Adjuster Regulations
1. FOUR SEPARATE LICENSES, AND YOU MAY HOLD ONE. § 684A.050(1) bars concurrency “under the same license or separate licenses.”
2. “STAFF ADJUSTER” IS A WORKERS’ COMP ROLE AT A TPA. The carrier’s employee is a COMPANY adjuster — and that license is VOLUNTARY.
3. § 684A.040(4) SWITCHES OFF THE MANDATE, THE GROSS MISDEMEANOR AND THE $1,0·0·0 FINE for any salaried insurer employee.
4. A PUBLIC ADJUSTER MAY NEVER HANDLE WORKERS’ COMP — the exclusion is inside the definition, and the exam matrix proves it.
5. NO LIFE OR HEALTH ADJUSTER LICENSING AT ALL — § 684A.010. And body shop owners may not be licensed — § 684A.055.
6. CATASTROPHE IS § 684A.060, NOT § 684A.150. A private body may designate it, the insurer applies, and work may precede the filing by 5 days. Term 90 days.
7. 20 PRELICENSING HOURS — 5 + 15, within 2 years — ON A REGULATION ONLY. No statute requires it and the Division does not publish it.
8. 70 POINTS, SCALED — not 70 percent. It was 80 before 1 July 2018, and question counts are not published.
9. FINGERPRINTS: RESIDENTS ONLY, at their own expense. Nonresidents and entities are not printed.
10. $1·2·5 + $6·0 = $1·8·5, and § 684A.050(2) is the bridge that makes company and staff adjusters pay at all. Two $5·0 Division charges do not trace.
11. THREE-YEAR TERM ON A ROLLING MONTH-END, and 24 CE HOURS PER THREE YEARS — not per biennium. No carry-over.
12. NRS 686A.310 HAS NO FREQUENCY ELEMENT — A SINGLE ACT IS A VIOLATION. The general-business-practice test is in NAC 686A.600(1) and reaches .600–.680 only.
13. SIXTEEN PRACTICES, (a) THROUGH (p). (o) advising against counsel and (p) misleading about a limitations period are squarely adjuster conduct.
14. THE PRIVATE RIGHT RUNS TO “ITS INSURED” ONLY. Gunny (1992) bars third-party claimants; § 686A.325(2) confirms it by creating no action for anyone but the Commissioner.
15. WATCH THE UNITS. NAC 686A.670 runs 20 WORKING then 30 CALENDAR from the same trigger; 686A.675(1) runs 30 WORKING to decide and 30 CALENDAR to pay.
16. THE BAD-FAITH TEST IS CONJUNCTIVE — the “or” is inside the scienter prong, never between the prongs.
17. PUNITIVE DAMAGES vs. A BAD-FAITH INSURER ARE UNCAPPED — § 42.005(2)(b) — AND THE § 42.001 DEFINITIONS DO NOT APPLY EITHER — § 42.005(5). Almost nobody charts the second.
18. AN ADJUSTER CAN BE SUED PERSONALLY — § 684A.035 applies § 686A.310 to adjusters and rewrites the noun.
19. UM IS MANDATORY, REJECTED IN WRITING. UIM IS OFFERED ONLY, PURCHASED IN WRITING — AND RE-OFFERED AT EVERY RENEWAL.
20. THE UIM MEASURE IS DAMAGES-BASED, not difference-in-limits. Comparative fault is against the COMBINED fault, and a 50/50 split RECOVERS.
21. THE 65% IS A TITLING DEFINITION, excluding painting, spec electronics and towing. The 80% figure is a failed 2017 bill. The claim rule, NAC 686A.680, has no percentage at all.
22. WILDFIRE MAY BE EXCLUDED since 1 January 2026 — with no duty to offer standalone coverage and no disclosure duty.
23. GUARANTY: WC UNCAPPED · UNEARNED PREMIUM $1·0,0·0·0 · ALL OTHER $3·0·0,0·0·0 · NO CLAIMANT DEDUCTIBLE. Filing bar 25 months from the ORDER OF LIQUIDATION.
24. FRAUD REPORTING IS MANDATORY, WITH NO DEADLINE AND NO IMMUNITY — and no general fraud warning statement is required.
25. COMP: 30 DAYS TO ACCEPT OR DENY, TREBLE ON THE ADMINISTRATOR’S ORDER FOR UNREASONABLE DELAY, AND NO PRESUMPTION EITHER WAY.
26. COMP BAD FAITH IS BARRED. § 616D.030 reversed Falline; Madera (1998) applied it. Administrative fines are the exclusive remedy.
2. “STAFF ADJUSTER” IS A WORKERS’ COMP ROLE AT A TPA. The carrier’s employee is a COMPANY adjuster — and that license is VOLUNTARY.
3. § 684A.040(4) SWITCHES OFF THE MANDATE, THE GROSS MISDEMEANOR AND THE $1,0·0·0 FINE for any salaried insurer employee.
4. A PUBLIC ADJUSTER MAY NEVER HANDLE WORKERS’ COMP — the exclusion is inside the definition, and the exam matrix proves it.
5. NO LIFE OR HEALTH ADJUSTER LICENSING AT ALL — § 684A.010. And body shop owners may not be licensed — § 684A.055.
6. CATASTROPHE IS § 684A.060, NOT § 684A.150. A private body may designate it, the insurer applies, and work may precede the filing by 5 days. Term 90 days.
7. 20 PRELICENSING HOURS — 5 + 15, within 2 years — ON A REGULATION ONLY. No statute requires it and the Division does not publish it.
8. 70 POINTS, SCALED — not 70 percent. It was 80 before 1 July 2018, and question counts are not published.
9. FINGERPRINTS: RESIDENTS ONLY, at their own expense. Nonresidents and entities are not printed.
10. $1·2·5 + $6·0 = $1·8·5, and § 684A.050(2) is the bridge that makes company and staff adjusters pay at all. Two $5·0 Division charges do not trace.
11. THREE-YEAR TERM ON A ROLLING MONTH-END, and 24 CE HOURS PER THREE YEARS — not per biennium. No carry-over.
12. NRS 686A.310 HAS NO FREQUENCY ELEMENT — A SINGLE ACT IS A VIOLATION. The general-business-practice test is in NAC 686A.600(1) and reaches .600–.680 only.
13. SIXTEEN PRACTICES, (a) THROUGH (p). (o) advising against counsel and (p) misleading about a limitations period are squarely adjuster conduct.
14. THE PRIVATE RIGHT RUNS TO “ITS INSURED” ONLY. Gunny (1992) bars third-party claimants; § 686A.325(2) confirms it by creating no action for anyone but the Commissioner.
15. WATCH THE UNITS. NAC 686A.670 runs 20 WORKING then 30 CALENDAR from the same trigger; 686A.675(1) runs 30 WORKING to decide and 30 CALENDAR to pay.
16. THE BAD-FAITH TEST IS CONJUNCTIVE — the “or” is inside the scienter prong, never between the prongs.
17. PUNITIVE DAMAGES vs. A BAD-FAITH INSURER ARE UNCAPPED — § 42.005(2)(b) — AND THE § 42.001 DEFINITIONS DO NOT APPLY EITHER — § 42.005(5). Almost nobody charts the second.
18. AN ADJUSTER CAN BE SUED PERSONALLY — § 684A.035 applies § 686A.310 to adjusters and rewrites the noun.
19. UM IS MANDATORY, REJECTED IN WRITING. UIM IS OFFERED ONLY, PURCHASED IN WRITING — AND RE-OFFERED AT EVERY RENEWAL.
20. THE UIM MEASURE IS DAMAGES-BASED, not difference-in-limits. Comparative fault is against the COMBINED fault, and a 50/50 split RECOVERS.
21. THE 65% IS A TITLING DEFINITION, excluding painting, spec electronics and towing. The 80% figure is a failed 2017 bill. The claim rule, NAC 686A.680, has no percentage at all.
22. WILDFIRE MAY BE EXCLUDED since 1 January 2026 — with no duty to offer standalone coverage and no disclosure duty.
23. GUARANTY: WC UNCAPPED · UNEARNED PREMIUM $1·0,0·0·0 · ALL OTHER $3·0·0,0·0·0 · NO CLAIMANT DEDUCTIBLE. Filing bar 25 months from the ORDER OF LIQUIDATION.
24. FRAUD REPORTING IS MANDATORY, WITH NO DEADLINE AND NO IMMUNITY — and no general fraud warning statement is required.
25. COMP: 30 DAYS TO ACCEPT OR DENY, TREBLE ON THE ADMINISTRATOR’S ORDER FOR UNREASONABLE DELAY, AND NO PRESUMPTION EITHER WAY.
26. COMP BAD FAITH IS BARRED. § 616D.030 reversed Falline; Madera (1998) applied it. Administrative fines are the exclusive remedy.
§ 684A.050(1)
The concurrency bar — “under the same license or separate licenses” — and the proof that Nevada’s four adjuster credentials are separate instruments, not sub-types.
§ 684A.050(2)
The fee bridge. § 680C.110 names only independent and public adjusters; this subsection is what makes company and staff adjusters pay anything at all.
Company adjuster
The carrier’s salaried employee — and licensure is an element of the definition, which is precisely why the credential is voluntary and the mandate can never bite.
Staff adjuster
A workers’ compensation adjuster at a registered third-party administrator. ⚠ NOT the carrier’s employee. The one term most likely to be imported wrong.
§ 684A.040(4)
“The provisions of subsections 1, 2 and 3 do not apply to a salaried employee of an insurer.” The mandate, the gross misdemeanor and the $1,0·0·0 fine all switch off.
Responsible insurance associations
The private bodies that, alongside the Commissioner, may designate a catastrophe under § 684A.060(2). No governmental declaration is required.
Renewal date
§ 684A.130(7) — the last day of the month three years after the month of issuance. A rolling, licensee-specific anniversary, not a statewide date and not a birthday.
70 points
NAC 684A.300 — “a score of 70 or more points”; Pearson calls it a scaled cut of 70. Neither says “percent,” and it was 80 before 1 July 2018.
NAC 686A.600(1)
Where the general business practice element actually lives — and it governs NAC 686A.600 to .680 only. It cannot narrow the statute above it.
“Its insured”
The two words in § 686A.310(2) that make the private right first-party only — and, after the § 684A.035 substitution, the weak joint in the adjuster-liability claim.
§ 686A.325(2)
An express anti-remedy: failure to give third-party settlement notice creates no cause of action for anyone but the Commissioner and no defense for any party. A double negative.
§ 42.005(5)
The inversion nobody charts. For insurer bad faith the NRS 42.001 definitions do not apply and the common law does — dropping the “despicable conduct” requirement.
§ 684A.035
The substitution rule that applies § 686A.310 to adjusters and replaces “insurer” with “adjuster.” The entire (a)–(p) list binds an individual adjuster.
Damages-based UIM
§ 687B.145(2) — what must exceed the tortfeasor’s limits is the insured’s DAMAGES, with the insured’s own limits as the cap. Not difference-in-limits.
Total loss vehicle
§ 487.790 — repair cost 65% or more of fair market value, excluding painting, spec electronics and towing. A titling definition, not a settlement trigger.
§ 616D.030
“No cause of action may be brought or maintained against an insurer or a third-party administrator…” The 1995 statute that reversed Falline and abolished comp bad faith.
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